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I met John Noonan in the office of the late David W. Louisell
in January, 1974, and remember to this day just how awestruck I
was at being in the company of such great scholars. I find myself
even more humbled as I pen this essay in honor of the birthday of
my esteemed teacher, advisor, and friend. To be invited to join the
festschrift is an extraordinary honor for a former student but it is
also an immense challenge. The task of writing a coherent essay
for one's professor usually ends upon graduation from law school.
To write one in honor of a professor (and a favorite one at that) is
an altogether new experience.
Because I write to pay tribute to a man whose manner of
thinking has indelibly shaped the manner in which I teach my own
students, my goal is to write an essay that builds upon the work he
has done in the field of law and religion. And if, in the final analy-
sis, it meets that standard, it will do so, in part, because of John
Noonan's efforts as a teacher, scholar and role model.
INTRODUCTION
It has been apparent for nearly fifty years that, for all practical
purposes, Federal judges claim the power to oversee both federal
and state policy on the subject of religious freedom, including the
sensitive topic of church-state relations. It seems largely to be as-
sumed that this is simply the "way it is" or, perhaps more accu-
rately, "the way it should be." But why? By what right does the
Judicial Department of the federal government exercise controlling
authority over matters of religious liberty?1
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. This article was
written as the introduction to a much longer work "By What Right: The Sources and Lim-
its of Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters 'Touching Religion.'" It
is currently scheduled to appear in Volume 29 of the Indiana Law Journal, due to be pub-
lished during the 1995-96 academic year.
1. The phrase is borrowed from Louis Lusky. Louis Lusky, By What Right? A Com-
mentary on the Supreme Court's Power to Revise the Constitution (Michie, 1975).
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
Like so many other questions of great import in our pluralistic,
continental democracy, the Constitution and its amendments do
not address this question directly. All we know for certain from
the text of the Constitution is that the three branches of the federal
government have been granted powers which, by their nature, are
conducive to the preservation of the general welfare.2 Pursuant to
Articles I and IV, for example, Congress has the power to lay and
collect taxes, to provide for the common defence and general wel-
fare of the United States, and to establish uniform rules on matters
relating to the growth and development of the Nation and its econ-
omy.3 But there is no express power under the original Constitu-
tion which authorizes Congress to make laws respecting
establishments of religion, or which would permit it to adopt laws
designed to inhibit religious exercise, even if it could be argued
that laws respecting religious establishments or limiting free exer-
cise would be in the public interest. Legislation requiring a reli-
gious test "as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States" is expressly forbidden.'
The Amendments shed no greater light on the question of fed-
eral court authority to make national rules regarding establish-
ments of religion or the permissible scope of free exercise. From
the text of the First, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments we learn
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"' 5 that "[n]o per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law,"' 6 and that the enumerated powers of the federal
government are not to be viewed as incompatible with the rights
retained by the People and the States, respectively.7 And from the
Fourteenth Amendment we ascertain three points important to this
inquiry: first, that the States may not inhibit Citizens of the United
States in the exercise of their federal Privileges and Immunities;
second, the States are prohibited from denying to any person
within their jurisdiction due process or equal protection of the
laws; and third, that Congress has the power to assure that the
States comply.
2. US Const Arts I, IV, V.
3. See US Const Art I, § 8, cl (1-18), §§ 9-10; Art IV.
4. US Const Art VI, cl 3.
5. US Const Amend I (1791).
6. US Const Amend V (1791).
7. US Const Amends IX, X (1791).
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How then, does the Court come to be "in charge" of such a
critical topic? If Article III does not even expressly grant the
power of judicial review, why should it be assumed that the implied
(but necessary) power recognized in Marbury v Madison8 leaves
the federal courts in sole charge of what virtually all observers-
especially those who lived during the Founding generation-
viewed as one of the most exquisitely sensitive issues in all of pub-
lic policy? 9 This is a question which admits of many answers, but
has received comparatively little attention.
Because the issue is so very sensitive, it may be helpful to re-
state the question in constitutional terms: "To whom does the
Constitution assign the twin tasks of protecting religious liberty
and setting the boundaries between church and state?"
Because the ultimate answer under the Constitution is "the
People" themselves, 10 the present inquiry will center on the nature
and locus of the power over these topics which has been delegated
or reserved by the Constitution and its amendments. Its goal is to
lay a partial foundation for the development of a framework within
which to review the substantive content of the constitutional law
governing religious liberty.
Part I will discuss the structural device of separation of powers
and its relationship to the First Amendment. Part II will discuss
federalism, and the manner in which it too is a device to protect the
First Amendment rights of the people. Forthcoming essays will
build upon this framework, examining, in turn, the relationship of
the structural aspects of the federal religious liberty guarantees to
the Supreme Court's vision of its own role; the manner in which
the Court's vision of its role affects its interpretation of the sub-
stantive dimensions of religious liberty; and the constitutionality of
federal and State legislative efforts to define the scope of religious
liberty.
8. 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
9. During the debate of the House of Representatives, sitting as a Committee of the
Whole on August 15, 1789 Congressman Daniel Carroll of Maryland is quoted as having
noted that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little
bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand". Chester J. Antieau, Arthur T. Downey &
Edward C. Roberts, Freedom from Federal Establishment: Formation and Early History of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses 126 (Bruce, 1964), quoting Annals of Congress L
10. It has long been held that the Constitution is not the creature of the States, but of
the People themselves, acting in Convention; for it was by the action of the Constitutional
Convention and the State ratifying conventions that the delegation and reservation of pow-
ers and rights obtains its binding force. See US Const, Preamble, Art V; McCulloch v
Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 403-06 (1819).
3551
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In many ways, this essay is also designed to lay the ground-
work for asking a far more important question-a question which
has been central to much of John Noonan's writing: "Has the
power granted, implied, or assumed been exercised responsibly by
those entrusted with it; that is in a manner consistent with the high-
est standards of constitutional law and professional ethics?"' 1 This,
I believe, is a far more interesting (and revealing) question than
the rather pedestrian one addressed here, namely: who is author-
ized by the Constitution to assure the protection of religious lib-
erty? Of necessity, however, that inquiry will have to wait.
Because inquiries of this type must include not only an exami-
nation of nature and extent of federal and state power (legislative,
executive and judicial) over matters affecting religious liberty, but
also the structural limitations federalism and separation of powers
impose on those powers, it is important to emphasize at the outset
that the present discussion presumes that active intervention on be-
half of religious liberty by the State and federal governments is
both legitimate as a matter of constitutional law and necessary as a
matter of fact. The questions are: when?, by whom?, under what
circumstances?, and to what end?
One final word about "structural" analysis is worth mention-
ing at the outset. The topics to be explored here are "structural" in
the sense that their primary focus is on the text and structure of the
amended federal constitution as an integrated whole.' 2 The pri-
mary focus here will be on the allocation of power within the fed-
eral system rather than upon the specific normative content of the
religious liberty guarantees. The provisions most clearly directed
to the protection of religious liberty-the Test Clause of Article VI
and the First and Fourteenth Amendments-are considered here
only from that limited perspective. Due to space limitations, a
11. The Preamble to the ABAs Model Rules of Professional Responsibility states that
the Model Rules define, for lawyers, "their relationship to our legal system." ABA Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility, Preamble [12] in John S. Dzienkowski, ed, Selected
Statutes, Rules and Standards on the Legal Profession at 7 (West, 1993).
12. See Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Ameri-
cans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence at 6-7 (Academic Press, 1991). Professor
Presser suggests that the task is to determine the "plain meaning" of the document. Unlike
theories of "original intent" which attempt to divine (usually unsuccessfully) the legislative
intent of the framers on given issues, compare H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent, 98 Harv L Rev 885 (1985), Presser argues that it is
necessary for us to try to determine the political, linguistic, or cultural 'structure'
which the Constitution implied, on which the drafters and first interpreters of the
document would have been expected to rely, and on which their claims for an
objective interpretation of the Constitution would have been staked.
[Vol. 11
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"structural" review of the normative content of those guarantees,
including the more "doctrinal" aspects of the current debate over
religious liberty issues, will be developed in subsequent essays.' 3
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION'S RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY GUARANTEES
By all criteria relevant to constitutional analysis (save, some
might argue, the Court's holding in Employment Division v
Smith'4), the preservation of religious liberty is an important con-
stitutional concern. 15 The only mention of religion in the Constitu-
tion itself is an express prohibition of religious discrimination: the
Test Clause of Article VI. 16 Though there was some dispute among
the framers, the States, and the antifederalists concerning the ex-
tent to which the enumerated powers of the federal government
could be utilized to set national policy respecting establishments of
religion and religious liberty, there was little dispute among them
about the core of the matter: the powers granted the federal gov-
ernment did not include a specific supervisory jurisdiction over
either religious matters generally, or the relationship of religion
and religious institutions to the political communities of the
Nation.
17
13. Among these are: the importance of a clearly-articulated vision of religious liberty
in the formulation of public policy, the debate among advocates for religious liberty which
has followed in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v Smith,
494 US 872 (1990), and the substantive vision of religious liberty which can be derived
from the Court's holdings.
14. 494 US 872 (1990).
15. At this point in the inquiry, it is not necessary to determine either the substantive
content of the right protected, or the manner in which it should be characterized for pur-
poses of constitutional analysis. The initial focus is on the text of the amended Constitu-
tion itself. This fact is underscored most forcefully by the Test Clause of Article VI. At the
time of the Constitutional Convention, all of the States required religious tests for public
office. The decision by the Convention that the federal government should have no relig-
iously-based conditions for office-holding was, therefore, a significant advance for religious
liberty at the federal level. Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution at 425-26 (Lit-
tle Brown & Co, 1937). The Test Clause is discussed at greater length in the text accompa-
nying notes 36 to 62.
16. US Const Art VI, cl 3.
17. The dissenting members of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention were perhaps
the most explicit on this point. TWenty-one of the twenty-three members of the minority
signed a dissenting address which appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Adver-
tiser on December 18, 1787, six days after Pennsylvania's convention had voted (46-23) to
ratify. The first of its "propositions to the convention" reads as follows:
1. The right of conscience shall be held inviolable; and neither the legislative,
executive nor judicial powers of the United States shall have authority to alter,
abrogate, or infringe any part of the constitution of the several states, which pro-
vide for the preservation of liberty in matters of religion.
355]
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The Bill of Rights reflects that consensus. Whatever the ex-
tent of federal authority to legislate a national policy concerning
religion or religious establishments under Article I, and in particu-
lar, the General Welfare and Necessary and Proper Clauses 8 , there
is no doubt that the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments make ex-
plicit as to Congress that which the Federalists had argued all
along: Congress has no power to infringe upon either the religious
liberty of individuals, or the power of States to set what they con-
sider to be the proper boundaries between church and state.'9
"The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
to their Constituents" (December 18, 1787) (attributed to Samuel Bryan, the author of
"Centinel"), in Ralph Ketcham, ed, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Con-
vention Debates at 239 (Mentor, 1986). See also notes 157 to 186 and accompanying text.
18. See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). The debate over whether
the Congress had the authority to "establish" a national religion or church is not unlike the
question of whether Congress had the power to establish the Bank of the United States.
Congressional power was given broad berth in McCulloch, where the Court held that Con-
gress "would have some choice of means[, and] might employ those which, in its judgment,
would most advantageously effect the object to be accomplished. That any means adapted
to the end, any means which tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers
of the government, were in themselves constitutional." Id, 17 US at 419. Given the feder-
alist reading of the Constitution, both at the time of the Convention and in practice once it
had been ratified, there is (or should be) little doubt that a plausible case could be (and
was) made by the antifederalists that the prohibition with respect to matters of religion
needed to be explicit.
19. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale
L J 1193, 1198-1203 (1992) [(discussing the relationship between the general prohibitions
of Art I, § 9, and the specific prohibitions of the Art I, § 10 (binding the States), and the
First Amendment (binding Congress alone)] [hereafter, Amar, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1138-
1141, 1146-62 (1991) (discussing the Federalist and Anti-Federalist critiques of the Consti-
tution, as well as the federalism components of the proposals which evolved into the First
Amendment as we know it today) [hereafter, Amar, The Bill of Rights].
This reading of the enumerated powers is also supported by the lengthy list of enact-
ments passed by the First and subsequent Congresses dealing with the subject of religion,
including the Northwest ordinance of 1787, Statutes of 1789, c 8 (August 7, 1789) ("Reli-
gion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged."), and religious
exemptions from laws of general applicability. See, for example 2 Stat 194 (adopting Vir-
ginia tax exemption for churches in a taxing plan for the County of Alexandria); Act of
July 9, 1798, 8, 1 Stat 585 (requiring that all lands and dwellings in the federal district be
appraised for tax purposes of federal taxes notwithstanding their exemption under state
law); Act of July 14, 1798, 2, 1 Stat 598; Act of August 2, 1813, 4, 3 Stat 71; Act of January
9, 1815, 5, 3 Stat 166 (direct taxes levied by Congress which expressly or impliedly incorpo-
rated state exemptions for religious organizations). All of these are laws of general appli-
cability and were adopted by Congress in a field clearly committed to it by the text of the
Constitution. See also 6 Stat 116 (1813) and 6 Stat 162 (1816) (exempting plates for print-
ing Bibles from import duties); 6 Stat 346 (1826) (same; exempting church vestments, furni-
ture and paintings); 6 Stat 675 (1834) (same; exempting church bells); 12 Stat 717, c74 (37th
Cong. 3d Sess 1863) ("exempting from duty [printing] plate belonging to religious
societies").
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To the extent that the Test Clause and Bill of Rights operate as
an express limitation on the scope of federal authority to make
rules governing religion, a thorough evaluation of the normative
content of the religious liberty jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court would be incomplete without a detailed explora-
tion of the manner in which this limitation of federal political com-
petence20 is reflected in the language and structure of the amended
Constitution. Of particular interest in this and subsequent essays is
how the constraints of the Constitution and Bill of Rights apply to
policy made by the "judiciary department" of the federal govern-
ment in the course of its decision of cases or controversies involv-
ing religious liberty.
A. Structuralism and the "Judicial Department"
Since "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding, ' 21 I begin with Alexander Hamilton's observation
concerning the role of the judiciary in our federal system. "[T]he
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the peo-
ple and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority. 22 This interme-
diate role, according to Hamilton, was to be governed by a clear
understanding on the part of the judges that "[a] constitution is, in
fact, and must be regarded by [them] as, a fundamental law."12 3
From this perspective, judicial review does not "by any means
suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It
20. As used here, the phrase "limited political competence" is intended to convey the
same sort of conceptual limitation on the policy-making function as the phrase "limited
subject matter jurisdiction" does in the context of judicial decision-making. As applied to
the federal government, the phrase refers to limits on the authority of federal officials to
make, implement, enforce or interpret federal statutory and constitutional law which are
derived either from the limited scope of the power granted, or explicit limits, such as the
First Amendment. See United States v Lopez, - US -, 115 S Ct 1624 (1995); Oregon v
Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970) (opinion of Harlan). Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v California, 113 S Ct 2891, 2918 (1993) drew the distinction
nicely when he stated, among other things, that jurisdiction to prescribe (such as to make
the rule of decision) is "quite a separate matter from jurisdiction to adjudicate" as defined
in § 231 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations. Compare Restatement of the Law (3d)
Foreign Relations Law of The United States § 401 (Categories Of Jurisdiction) [defining and
distinguishing "jurisdiction to prescribe," "jurisdiction to adjudicate" and "jurisdiction to
enforce"].
21. McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis added).
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only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both[.] ''24
Hamilton was explicit: judges "ought to regulate their decisions by
the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not
fundamental.
25
Determining whether the judiciary have regulated their deci-
sions "by the fundamental laws", however, is not an easy task. Be-
cause "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,"'26 the Court has the final word.
Its holdings must be treated, for all practical purposes, as "infalli-
ble"'27 statements of constitutional law until they are modified or
overruled.28
The initial task then is to translate the concept of constitutional
supremacy into an analytical framework which can be utilized to
"review"-rather than simply to justify or criticize-the rules de-
veloped by the United States Supreme Court to govern constitu-
tional decisionmaking.29 Such a framework should be broad
enough to support a review of both the methodology the Court has
developed to guide constitutional interpretation (standards of re-
view), and the rules which reflect the Court's understanding of a
particular phrase or clause of the Constitution itself (constitutional
norms).
The only framework adequate to such a task is the Constitu-
tion as an integrated whole. The text, the structural framework,
and interpretation of every provision of the amended Constitution
which applies to the issues under scrutiny are critical components
of a "structural" analysis of the Court's holdings.3 °
24. Id at 467-68. The Preamble, US Const, Preamble (1787), the Supremacy Clause,
US Const Art VI, cl 3 (1787), and the amendatory powers contained in Article V, US
Const Art V (1787), are among the express affirmations of the sovereignty of the people.
25. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) at 468 (cited in note 22).
26. Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
27. The late Justice Robert Jackson coined the now-famous phrase: "We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v Allen,
344 US 443, 540 (1953) (opinion concurring in result). The use of such imagery to describe
the Court's work leads to quite a few misunderstandings concerning the nature of power in
the federal system, and how, if at all, it is shared among all those who participate in its
governance, including "the People". See Louis Fisher (cited in note 29).
28. For an extended, and illuminating, discussion of the rule of stare decisis, see
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 112 S Ct 2791 (1992). See also
Charles L. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73
Cornell L Rev 401 (1988); William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum L Rev 735 (1949).
29. See generally Louis Fisher, The Curious Belief in Judicial Supremacy, 25 Suffolk L
Rev 85 (1991).
30. US Const Art VI, cl 2 (Supremacy Clause).
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The interpretive goal is a lofty one: to maintain the Constitu-
tion's character as a succinct statement of the "consent of the gov-
erned."' 31 The first part of the analytical task, thankfully, is a bit
narrower. It presents two basic structural questions:
1. What express or implied power(s) respecting religious lib-
erty questions are granted to the federal courts?; and
2. What constraints, express or implied, operate to limit judi-
cial authority respecting religious liberty?
B. Substantive Limits on the Exercise of Federal Power:
Legislative, Executive and Judicial
Most discussions of religious liberty are rather narrowly fo-
cused. The First Amendment is viewed as the primary source of
the constitutional norms relevant to religious liberty, and the Four-
teenth is viewed primarily as the conduit through which its norms
are applicable to the States.32 The non-discrimination norms em-
bodied in the Test Clause do not get much attention,33 even when
31. Compare Amar, 101 Yale L J at 1131-33 (cited in note 19) with Howard Gutman,
Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S Cal L Rev 295, 328-31, 379-
81 (1981).
32. Nearly thirty years ago, Justice William Brennan described the "logical interrela-
tionship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses" as a "paradox central to
our scheme of liberty." School Dist. of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 US 203, 247,
230, 231 (Brennan concurring). In Texas Monthly v Bullock, Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor agreed with Justice Scalia's observation that the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses often appear like Scylla and Charybdis, leaving a State little room to maneu-
ver between them," and added their own impression that "The Press Clause adds yet a
third hazard to a State's safe passage through the legislative waters.... We in the judiciary
must be wary of interpreting these three constitutional Clauses in a manner that negates
the legislative role altogether". Texas Monthly v Bullock, 489 US 1, 28 (Blackmun and
O'Connor concurring in the judgment).
33. See Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488 (1961). See generally Gerard Bradley, The No
Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone
of Itself, 37 Case W Res L Rev 674 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Histor-
ical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion 103 Harv L Rev 1410 (1990). Professor
Bradley notes that "one outstanding example of article VI neglect is Professor Tibe's rele-
gation of his article VI discussion to a single footnote. He observes that it is 'now of little
independent significance.' That's it." Bradley at 677-78 & n 19, citing Laurence Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 813 n 1 (Foundation Press, 1978). In the second edition,
Professor Tribe takes the same position. Laurence Tibe, American Constitutional Law
1155 n 1 (Foundation Press, 2d ed, 1988).
355]
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. 11
they are clearly relevant3. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments are
largely ignored.
Under a structural approach, all of these provisions and more
must be considered, not only as potential warrants for the protec-
tion of individual liberty (the usual approach), but also as limita-
tions on government power - including that of judges - to take
action inconsistent with religious liberty.
1. The Test Clause
The Test Clause is quintessentially federal: "no religious test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public
34. The Congress long exempted itself from the civil rights laws it applied to everyone
else, but the first bill reported out of the 104th Congress is legislation which ends those
exemptions. Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub L 104-1, 109 Stat 5, codified at
2 USC §§ 1301, 1302, 1317, 1351, 1361, 1381-85, 1405, 1408-15, 1438. Though House and
Senate Rules forbade most forms of discrimination in employment, including discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion, there was, prior to the passage of the Accountability Act, no
procedure for enforcement of these guarantees which is comparable to that afforded citi-
zens who do not work for Congress. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC
§ 2000e-16 (West, 1992); Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 117, PL 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (102nd
Cong 1st Sess.) Compare Davis v Passman, 442 US 228 (1979); Powell v McCormack, 395
US 486 (1969). See generally Jacob Weisberg, "Do As ISAY," The New Republic v 193, at
12 (November 18, 1985); Daniel Rapoport, "The Imperial Congress-Living Above the
Law," 11 National Journal at 911 (1979).
35. Extensive discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments is beyond the scope of
this essay. It is interesting to note, however, that neither the Court nor the academy quite
know what to do with either of them. Though intended as a limit on federal power, there is
an extensive literature on the Ninth Amendment as a justification for expanding it. See,
for example, Randy E. Barnett, ed, Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64
Chi-Kent L Rev 37-268 (1988); Lawrence Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the
Fourth, and Plead the Fifth, But What on Earth Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment?,
Id at 239; Randy E. Barnett, ed, The Rights Retained By The People: The History And
Meaning Of The Ninth Amendment (George Mason Press, 1989); Charles L. Black, Deci-
sion According To Law (W. W. Norton & Co, 1981). A notable exception is Professor
Calvin Massey's article, The Anti-federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications For State
Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis L Rev 1229. Not only is Professor Massey's thesis an inter-
esting one, it contains an extremely useful collection of the literature. See Massey at 1229-
39 & n 2 (discussing the academic literature).
The Tenth Amendment, by contrast, is conceded by the Court to provide some limit
on federal authority, including its own, but the extent to which it will be exercised is not at
all clear. Compare New York v United States, 505 US -, 112 S Ct 2408 (1992); South
Carolina v Baker, 486 US 505 (1988); and San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v
Garcia, 469 US 547 (1985), with National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976). The
United States Supreme Court did not address the Tenth Amendment issue in its recent
decision in United States v Lopez, - US -, 115 S Ct 1624 (1995) (5-4 decision). Signifi-
cantly, however, it did rest its holding that Congress did not possess a generalized police
power on a structural analysis of the reach of the Commerce Clause. All of the opinions,
save the separate dissent of Justice Stevens, address the jurisdictional question from that
perspective.
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Trust under the United States. '36 The President is the most obvi-
ous target of the prohibition; for it is the Chief Executive who exer-
cises of the power to appoint "Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law. '37
Less obvious from the text, but equally certain from the struc-
ture, is that the Test Clause limits not only the legislative power of
Congress, which might have imposed such tests as a legal qualifica-
tion for federal office, but also the power of every other entity or
official having power over "office[s] or public Trust[s] under the
United States."
The clause is thus an express limitation on the power of the
Judiciary and the heads of departments to appoint "inferior Of-
ficers" to assist them in their duties,38 and binds each house of
Congress when acting in its respective individual capacity. 39 It con-
36. US Const Art VI, cl 3 (emphasis added).
37. US Const Art II § 2, cl 2.
38. Id.
39. Though Professor Bradley believes that the Framers' discussions of Article VI in-
dicate "that [it] was applicable to the entire lawmaking process, and occurred against a
background of religious tests for precisely those high executive and legislative offices sup-
posed to have been excepted by such technical distinctions[,]" neither his reading of the
discussions, nor parsing of the Constitutional text, lead to a conclusion that they are "self-
evident." See Bradley, 37 Case W Res L Rev at 718-19 (cited in note 33).
The interpretive problem is multi-faceted, and must be divided along federal-state
lines; for the power of the States to set the qualifications for members of Congress remains
a hotly disputed issue. See US Term Limits Inc. v Hill, 115 S Ct 1842, 63 USLW 4113 (US
May 22, 1995) (5-4 decision). See generally Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will The
Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense Of The Constitutionality Of State-imposed Term Limi-
tations, 20 Hofstra L Rev 341 (1991); Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits in
Symposium: Positive Political Theory and Public Law 80 Georgetown L J 477 (1992). The
power of either House of Congress to "judge ... the elections, returns and qualifications of
its own members," Art I § 5, appears to allow for the possibility that such qualifications
could, if either the House or Senate so chose, include some form of religious test or test
oath. Neither Senators nor Representatives hold an "Office ... under the United States"
as that term is used in the Constitution. They are not "civil officers of the United States"
subject to impeachment under Article II § 4, and may not hold such offices while serving in
Congress. Art I § 5, cl 3. Legislators do, however, hold a "public Trust" as that term was
understood in the late eighteenth century-that of the people of the State or district which
elects them. See John Louis Lucaites, Flexibility and Consistency in Eighteenth-Century
Anglo-WhiggLm: A Case Study of the Rhetorical Dimensions of Legitimacy at 77-107 (PhD
dissertation, University of Iowa, August 1984) (available through U Microfilms Interna-
tional Dissertation Information Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan). The precise nature of
this "public trust" figures prominently in the Supreme Court's recent decision in US Term
Limits v Hill (cited above). The majority opinion indicates that "representatives owe pri-
mary allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation. As Justice
Story observed, each Member of Congress is 'an officer of the union, deriving his powers
and qualifications from the constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor con-
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strains the Senate in the exercise of its power to choose its of-
ficers,40 to advise and consent to the President's appointments,4'
and to choose a vice-president in the event that the Electors should
fail to do So. 4 2 It also binds the House of Representatives in the
exercise of their power to "choose their Speaker and other Of-
ficers '43 and to elect the President should the Electors fail to do
so."4 It also restricts the discretion of individual Senators and
Members of Congress, whose personal staff members hold offices
of public trust under the United States.45
Notably, the Test Clauses limits the exercise of State authority
as well. The office of Senator is unquestionably a "public Trust
under the United States," and until the adoption of the Seven-
teenth Amendment,46 the appointing authorities were the State
trollable by, the states.... Those officers owe their existence and functions to the united
voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people.' 1 Story [Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion] § 627. Representatives and Senators are as much officers of the entire union as is the
President." Id at 1853 (majority opinion, per Stevens). The majority's distinction between
an "officer of the United States" and an "officer of the Union", while relevant to the distri-
bution of power within the federal system, is not relevant to the duty imposed by the Test
Clause. Compare US Term Limits at 1875 (Kennedy concurring) (recognizing "a federal
right of citizenship, a relationship between the people of the Nation and their National
Government, with which the States may not interfere.") with id 1877 (Thomas, Scalia,
O'Connor, and Rehnquist dissenting) (noting that "[tihe Constitution simply does not rec-
ognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation.").
40. US Const Art I § 3.
41. US Const Art II § 2, cl 3.
42. US Const Amends XII § 4 (1804); XX § 4 (1933).
43. US Const Art I § 2, cl 5.
44. US Const Amends XII (1804); XX § (1933).
45. Though there are no cases which hold that employment in the legislative branch is
an "office or public TRust under the United States" under Article VI, there are two ways in
which to support the conclusion made in the text. The first is statutory. Individuals who
work for Congress are classified in a number of different ways for statutory purposes, see,
for example, 5 USC § 2107 (defining the term "Congressional employee"), but all are en-
gaged in "discharging . . . official function[s] under or in connection with the United
States" as that phrase is used in 5 USC § 2105 (cited in note 34). The second is by refer-
ence to the concept of "public 'Rust" itself. If the personal staff members of Senators,
Representatives or the leadership of House and Senate are not considered to be "Congres-
sional employees", their close identification with the individual who employs them makes
them administrators of the public TRust held by that individual.
There is a practical side to this question. Though it appears that the practice is less
widespread today, religious discrimination in Senate and Congressional offices has been
practiced openly for years. "In 1974 the Fort Worth Star-Telegram created a minor furor
when it reported that the House placement office regularly removed stipulations like
'white only' and 'attractive, smart, young, and no Catholics .. .' from hiring orders sent by
congressional offices." Jacob Weisberg, Do As ISAY, The New Republic v 193, at 12 (No-
vember 18, 1985). To the extent that the Test Clause itself protects Congressional employ-
ees from discrimination on the basis of religion, the civil rights exemptions Congress
provided for itself were on flimsy ground indeed. (See note 34).
46. US Const Amend XVII (1913).
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Legislatures.47 Governors have the power to make temporary Sen-
atorial appointments,18 and the States appoint presidential Elec-
tors49 and set their qualifications.5
The significance of the Test Clause is thus both structural and
normative. Its language and structure differentiate between the
powers of the newly-created federal government and those of the
States, and foreshadow the structural limits contained in the First
Amendment.5 ' Article VI, clause 3 requires an- oath or affirmation
in support of the Constitution from all officials and legislators, both
State and federal, but only the federal government was prohibited
from utilizing the religious tests to determine fitness for public of-
fice. The States, by contrast, commonly applied such tests to those
seeking State offices, 52 and at least one-Tennessee-felt free to
do so as late as 1977!
53
Given that structure, the Federalists "drew a nonestablishment
sum from the lack of federal jurisdiction over religion plus the test
47. US Const Art I § 3, cl 1.
48. US Const Amend XVII cl 2 (1913).
49. US Const Art II § 1, cl 2.
50. US Const Art I § 2, cl 1. Though presidential electors act by the authority of the
State and are not federal officials, Ray v Blair, 343 US 214, 224-225 (1952); In re Green, 134
US 377, 379 (1890), Article II's incompatibility clause, US Const Art II § 1, cl 2, recognizes
not only the federal nature of their function, compare Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112
(1970), but also that the public trust which reposes in that office is incompatible with polit-
ical, appointive or positions of "profit" under the United States. See generally 5 USC
§ 2105 (West, 1992). See also Reservists Committee to Stop War v Laird, 323 F Supp 833
(DC 1971), aff'd 495 F2d 1075, 162 US App DC 19, rev'd on other grounds, 418 US 208.
51. Professor Bradley notes that just.
as in the voter qualifications actually left to state law by article I, the Framers
could have cut into the comparatively 'illiberal' state orders had they wanted to.
Put differently and largely as a matter of legal analysis and not political wisdom,
an incision at this point could certainly have been justified as a necessary, limited
protection of the federal regime, and not as a wholesale invasion of state auton-
omy. This reticence and the overall sparseness of the record at least plausibly
confirm Pinckney's proposal as a matter of observation, both about the com-
pleted legal framework and the Framers' intentions: Congress should not regulate
the 'subject of religion.' "
Bradley, 37 Cas W Res L Rev at 693(cited in note 33). See also text at notes 157 to 175.
For an informative discussion of Federalist and Anti-Federalist views concerning the
allocation of legislative jurisdiction, including both jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce,
see generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism 79 Va L Rev 1957
(1993).
52. William G. Torpey, Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in America at 16 (UNC
Press, 1948), quoting Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America at 501
(MacMillan, 1902) (compilingstatistics "relative to religious qualifications for officeholders
in the first thirteen state constitutions.")
53. McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618 (1978), rev'g, Paty v McDaniel, 547 SW2d 897 (Tenn,
1977).
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ban," and asserted that "since the oath requirement was the only
plausible power one sect might use to gain the upper hand,"54 Ar-
ticle VI was "enough [of a religious liberty guarantee] for a federal
government of specific enumerated powers. '55 But this was not
enough for either the anti-Federalists (many of whom viewed the
Test and Supremacy Clauses as threats to religious liberty)56 or the
States; for it did not state explicitly that the federal government
had no enumerated power either to vex religious liberty directly or
to set national policy on the subject. That guarantee would have to
await the ratification of the First Amendment. But the first steps
had been taken, and the Test Clause was presented for ratification
as a guarantee that the appointment powers granted the federal
government-the powers which could be abused with the greatest
ease-would not be turned against entire classes of the citizenry.5 7
At the normative level, the Test Clause prohibits the most per-
sonal kind of imposition on one's religious liberty which can occur
at the hands of the federal government 58 -overt discrimination in
federal appointment, employment and in the enjoyment of the
54. See Bradley, 37 Cas W Res L Rev at 709 (cited in note 33) quoting IV Elliot's
Debates on the Federal Constitution at 196 (speech of James Iredell). This is a significant
point, especially in light of the current Court's understanding of the Establishment Clause.
See note 62. It seems to have been forgotten in contemporary church-state jurisprudence
that an "establishment of religion" was a many faceted enterprise which included, in addi-
tion to the preferential treatment of and support for identifiable religious groups, there
were also legal mechanisms designed to enforce the political and civil subordination of the
disfavored religions and their adherents. Among these were test oaths, requirements of
church membership and worship, and other civil disabilities. See generally William A.
Blakely, ed. & The Religious Liberty Ass'n, American State Papers and Related Documents
on Freedom in Religion 17-92 (Review and Herald, 1949).
55. Bradley, 37 Case W Res L Rev at 709 (Cited in note 33).
56. Id at 694-711.
57. Federalist 52, 57 (Madison), (cited in note 22). See generally Federalist 10, 51
(Madison) (cited in note 22). Professor Bradley writes that "[t]he no-test clause was sold
as a constitutionalized Golden Rule with a Machiavellian spin to it: 'Constrain yourself as
you would constrain others.'" Madison's views on the role factions should play in the
protection of all forms of liberty are thus clearly in evidence here. Bradley, 37 Cas W Res
L Rev at 702-707 (cited in note 33). The importance of Madison's views respecting the
role of politics in disputes over the meaning of religious liberty is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 157 to 183.
58. This statement presumes action by those exercising governmental authority de-
rived from the federal constitution. At the time of the Convention in 1787, " 'non-Chris-
tians' could not hold public office anywhere in the states, except perhaps in Virginia, and
there is no record of that actually occurring[, and] Catholics[,] ... the only non-Protestant
Christians around... were clearly eligible in Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland ...
Elsewhere only Protestants could hold office." Bradley, 37 Case W Res L Rev at 681-87
(cited in note 33)(emphasis in the original).
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public trust.5 9 Whether targeted on classes of believers or aimed at
59. There are only a few sources which shed light on the content of the phrase "any
Office or public Trust under the United States." The first part-"office ...under the
United States"-is relatively clear given the language of Article I, § 6 (Incompatibility
Clause) and Art, II, §§ 1, 2. It is arguable, though not by any means settled, that all per-
sons who hold elective offices, federal appointments, or who perform a federal function of
any sort, including members of the Armed Services and presidential Electors, are pro-
tected by the 'rest Clause. See 5 USC § 2104 (defining as an "officer" all Justices and
judges, as well as appointees of the President, the courts, heads of executive branch and
military departments and agencies, or any other person "engaged in the performance of a
Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act"). This would arguably in-
clude federal civil servants; for even if they are' not "inferior officers" under Article II,
Congress has explicitly recognized that they are indeed officers, 5 USC § 2104, and "indi-
vidual[s] holding an office of trust or profit or discharging an official function under or in
connection with the United States." See 5 USC § 2105 (West 1992) ("employee" includes
"officers" and civil service appointees).
The more interesting question is what constitutes a "public Trust under the United
States." The phrase appears to be broader than the term "office," a construction sup-
ported by the phrase "office of trust or profit under the United States" which appears in
the incompatibility clause of Article II, as well as by Congress' own distinction between
individuals "holding an office of trust or profit" and those who may be "discharging an
official function under or in connection with the United States". 5 USC § 2105(d) (empha-
sis added).
Federal case law sheds very little light on this question, but there are a number of
State cases construing the phrases "office or public Trust" and "Office of Trust or Profit"
which do provide some guidance on the meaning of the term "office of public trust or
profit". Those terms are commonly found in the incompatibility provisions of state consti-
tutions. See, for example, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Dallas, 4 US (4 DalI) 229
(1801) (US Attorney and Recorder of City of Philadelphia); Begich v Jefferson, 441 P 2d 27
(Alaska 1968) (position as state or federal legislator is incompatible with superintendent or
teaching positions in state operated school districts); Commonwealth ex rel Hancock v
Clark, 506 S W2d 503 (Ky, 1974) (postmaster of a fourth class post office was not exercising
an office of trust or profit under the United States ineligible to hold or exercise any office
of trust or profit under the Kentucky Constitution and so could serve as a member of a
county school board); Brown v Lillard, 814 P2d 1040 (Okla 1991) [position of state judge
(an office) is incompatible with compensated full or part-time teaching at a state institution
(a position of "profit")]; State v Turner, 168 Wis 170, 169 NW 304 (1918) (acceptance by
circuit court commissioner of the office of United States commissioner operated to vacate
ipso facto his office of circuit court commissioner under Wisconsin Const, Art 13, § 3). See
also Maxey v Bell, 41 Ga 183 (1870) (holding that the office of guardian is a "public trust"
under the Georgia Constitution, and thus subject to the rule that religious tests may not be
required). For a more generalized discussion of the term "public Trust" as the term was
commonly used in the Eighteenth Century, see Lucaites, Flexibility and Consistency (cited
in note 39).
Given the advent of the modern administrative state and laws which require federal
contractors and grantees of federal funding to comply with federal law in their dealings
with the public, see, for example, 42 USC § 2000d (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub L 100-259, Mar 22, 1988, 102 Stat 28, 20
USC §§ 1681 note, 1687, 1687 notes, 1688, 1688 note; 29 USC §§ 706, 794; 42 USC
§§ 2000d-4a, 6107, it is arguable that the explicit non-discrimination norm of the Test
Clause applies not only to federal employment, but also to federal contracting and grant-
eligibility considerations as well. Compare Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589 (1987); Walz v
Tax Comm'n, 397 US 664 (1970) with Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574
(1983).
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non-believers,6° the imposition of a religious test or oath is one of
the purest examples of intentional discrimination on religious
grounds; for it involves inquiry into the substance of personal reli-
gious belief and practice itself.
Viewed more broadly, the Test Clause is one of the most criti-
cal of the religious freedom guarantees: an express prohibition of
religious discrimination. It is clearly tied in spirit, if not in function,
to the equal citizenship provisions of Article IV, and those provi-
sions were themselves later echoed in the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Test Clause thus
underscores at the personal level that which the First Amendment
later made reasonably explicit at the institutional one: federal at-
tempts to assure what might now be termed "religiously-correct"
patterns of speech, thought and institutional preference are forbid-
den. Viewed structurally, as either one of the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, or as an "incorporated" norm
affecting the interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,6' its implications are
enormous.
62
There is not much federal case law on the topic, but that which does exist seems to
support a broad reading of the term. The Claims Court has stated that "[tiransactions relat-
ing to the expenditure of public funds require the highest degree of public trust and an
impeccable standard of conduct." Refine Construction Co. v United States, 12 Cl Ct 56, 63
(1987) (government contracts). Environmental Protection Agency grants for the construc-
tion of certain public works projects also constitute a public trust. See 40 CFR §§ 30.120,
33.300; Town of Fallsburg v United States, 22 Cl Ct 633, 641 (1991). And finally, the
grantee of broadcasting license is considered to be a public trustee, who must serve the
broad goals of the public interest convenience and necessity. Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC, 395 US 367, 383 (1969); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v
FCC, 707 F2d 1413, 1427-28 (DC Cir 1983). This question is discussed at greater length in
a forthcoming article.
60. See McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618 (1978); Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488 (1961).
61. "Torcaso, if it is to be grasped at all, affects an "incorporation" of article VI as
much as if the Court expressly said so." Bradley, 37 Case W Res L Rev at 718 (cited in
note 33).
62. The point here is that intentional discrimination on the basis of religion is prob-
lematic not only under the First Amendment, but also under the Test, Fourteenth Amend-
ment Privileges and Immunities, Citizenship, and Equal Protection Clauses as well. The
Court has not been entirely consistent on this point. Compare, for example, 113 S Ct 2217
(1993) (indicating that discrimination is forbidden) with: State v Davis, 504 NW2d 767
(Minn, 1993) cert den; sub nom Davis v Minnesota, 114 SCt 2120 (permitting religion-based
peremptory strikes in jury selection).
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2. The First Amendment
a) Congress
The First Amendment was necessary to assure the critics of
the new Constitution that Congress would not use its express or
implied powers (such as commerce, taxation or spending) to make
laws infringing State or individual prerogatives regarding religion.63
Necessarily included in this prohibition were federal attempts to
establish a national religion or dis-establish the established reli-
gions of the States which had them,64 and to enact or enforce laws
which sought to burden religious belief or practice.65 But what
about the President and the Supreme Court?
Though the usual approach is simply to assume the application
of the First Amendment to the Executive and Judicial branches,
other approaches have been a bit more thoughtful. The first Jus-
tice Harlan argued in 1907 that the "reflex character" of the
Amendment applies it to all levels of government. 66 More re-
cently, Akhil Reed Amar, has argued that "any automatic expres-
sio unius inference that citizens therefore lack analogous rights
63. For example, US Const Art I § 7, 8; Art IV § 3 (1787). See The Federalist, 32
(Hamilton), (cited in note 22).
64. See generally Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1954 Wash U L Q 371; Clifton B. Kruse, The Historical Meaning and Judicial
Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 Washburn
L J 65 (1962); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal
Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 Harv L Rev 513 (1968); William
K. Leitzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incor-
poration, 39 De Paul L Rev 1191 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1157-62 (cited
in note 19).
65. See Larsen v Valente, 456 US 228 (1982). Compare Washington v Davis, 426 US
229 (1976). See generally Donald Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doc-
trinal Development Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 Harv L Rev 1381 (1967).
The question of whether or not the Free Exercise Clause operates to grant an exception for
religious belief or practice burdened by otherwise constitutional laws of general applicabil-
ity was answered in the negative in Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990).
Arguing from historical materials, Professor Michael McConnell has argued that the
Court's conclusion is in error. Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understand-
ing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409 (1990). Professors Gerard Bradley
and Phillip Hamburger argue that McConnell is wrong. Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free
Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L Rev 245 (1991); Phil-
lip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 915 (1992).
Federal laws which relieve specific burdens on religion, see, for example, 42 USC
§§ 2000eaj), 2000e-2(e), or which encourage it as a general matter, see, for example, IRC
§ 501(c)(3), raise a number of'interpretive questions which are beyond the scope of the
present essay. The application of structural analysis to such questions will be addressed in
a forthcoming essay.
66. Patterson v Colorado, 205 US 454, 464 (1907) (Harlan dissenting).
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against the President or federal judges-or states-flies in the face
of the Ninth Amendment."67
One need not, however, take either route; for a rather
straightforward separation of powers analysis of the text and struc-
ture of the Constitution assures us that while the text of the First
Amendment applies only to the legislative acts of Congress,68 it
operates as a structural restraint on the Executive and the Judiciary
as well.
b) The President
The role of the President is "faithfully [to] execute" the law,
and includes an independent responsibility to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States. ' 69 The Chief Ex-
ecutive is thus obligated by the text itself to utilize the discretion
vested in the office in a manner informed by the entire
Constitution.
Since Congress may not pass laws "respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," legisla-
tion which, in the President's view, violates these religious liberty
norms may (and arguably must) be vetoed. 70  To the extent the
President considers it "necessary and expedient," legislation
designed to protect religious liberty may be recommended for Con-
gressional consideration, 71 and the President may decline to en-
force laws which are of doubtful constitutionality. 72  Where
legislation does not violate religious liberty norms and is otherwise
valid, faithful execution by the President presumes compliance
with its terms.73
67. Amar, 101 Yale L J at 1274 (cited in note 19).
68. Congress makes "laws" only through the constitutionally ordained mechanism of
bicameralism and presentment. Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US
919 (1983).
69. US Const Art II, § 1, cl 8.
70. Art I, § 7, cl 3. Compare Andrew Jackson, Veto Message of July 10, 1832, relating
to the Bank of the United States, James J. Richardson, ed, 3 Messages and Papers of the
Presidents 1139 (Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1896) with Daniel Webster, Address
of July 11, 1832 Concerning the Veto of the Re-Chartering of the Second Bank of the
United States, Edwin P. Whipple, ed, The Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster
(Little Brown & Co., 1889).
71. US Const Art II, § 3, cl 2.
72. A discussion of the President's power to decline to enforce laws which have either
become law without signature, Art I, § 7, cl 2, or which have been signed into law with
"reservations," but without an objection having been made in proper form is beyond the
scope of this essay. All such refusals are, of course, subject to judicial review.




In fact, the only instances in which the President could make a
plausible argument that the religious liberty guarantees of the First
Amendment do not apply to executive action are those in which
the chief executive is authorized by the Constitution to act inde-
pendently of Congress. 74  And since the instances in which in-
dependent presidential action is authorized are few indeed75 (to
the extent that they exist at all),76 the President is constrained by
the text of the First Amendment in all instances except those
where, in the words of the late Justice Robert Jackson, "he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.
'77
This leaves the President very little "structural" room to claim
authority unconstrained by the religious liberty guarantees, a point
recognized by Alexander Hamilton's argument in Federalist 69 that
the President "has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction. '7 8 Congress
makes all laws governing matters within the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral government, including "rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces, ' 79 and the Test Clause forbids
religious discrimination in Presidential appointments.80 Thus, of all
the powers of the Executive, only two-the power to conduct for-
74. The first line of attack against a presidential directive restricting First Amendment
rights would be that it is not authorized by law. &If it is authorized, the focus is properly on
the right of Congress to provide the authorization. If not, the action is valid only if the
President has other constitutional authority to act. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v
Sawyer, 343 US at 635-39 (Jackson concurring).
75. This, of course, is what Justice Jackson described as the "zone of twilight in which
[the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US at 637 (Jackson concurring).
76. Justice Jackson noted further that "Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential con-
trol in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presiden-
tial claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system." Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US at 637-638 (Jackson concurring).
77. Id, 343 US at 637 (Jackson concurring).
78. Federalist, 69 (Hamilton) at 422 (cited in note 22).
79. US Const Art I, § 1 and § 8, cl 14. Compare Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503
(1986) with 10 USC § 774, PL 100-180, Div A, tit V, § 508(A)(2), December 4, 1987, 101
Stat 1086 (restricting the scope of command discretion to forbid the wearing of religious
symbols by military personnel). See generally United States Department of Defense, Joint
Service Study on Religious Matters: Report of the Joint Study Group on Religious Practice
(March, 1985). See also Katcoff v Marsh, 755 F2d 223 (2d Cir, 1985) (rejecting a challenge
to the Congressional practice of authorizing military chaplains).
80. The question of whether or not the Chief Executive (or, perhaps more impor-
tantly, the Presidential staff) respects the prohibition is another matter entirely. Compare
note 85.
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eign policy,8' and the President's ability to command the "bully
pulpit"82 for an ostensibly religious purpose83 -do not fit readily
81. The power to conduct foreign policy is often differentiated by courts both from the
power to make it, see, for example, Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763 (1950); Greenham
Women Against Cruise Missiles v Reagan, 755 F2d 34 (2d Cir 1985) (per curiam); Dickson v
Ford, 521 F2d 234 (5th Cir 1975), and the power to implement policies enacted by the
Congress, including foreign assistance. There is broad agreement that the exercise of the
former are inherently political questions for which exist "a 'textually demonstrable consti-
tutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.' " Klinghoffer v
S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F2d 44, 49 (2d Cir 1991), quoting Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217
(1962). See generally Japan Whaling Ass'n v American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 US 221 (1986);
Reid v Covert, 354 US 1 (1957) (plurality opinion); Oetjen v Central Leather Co., 246 US
297 (1918). The difficulty arises when courts attempt to distinguish "making" or "con-
ducting" foreign policy from actions "implementing" it. See Lamont v Woods, 948 F2d
825, 843 (2d Cir 1991) (Walker concurring), ("the seemingly facile distinction between
"implementation" and "policy" raises more questions than it answers.")
To the extent that the President's actions are expressly or impliedly authorized by
Congress, the executive's actions are governed by a number of constitutional constraints,
including the separation of powers mandate that the judiciary have a due concern for the
"possible consequences of judicial action." Lamont v Woods, 948 F2d 825, 843 (2d Cir
1991) (Walker concurring), quoting Baker v Carr, 369 US at 211-212. United States v Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US 304 (1936). In addition, the manner and degree to which
the Bill of Rights applies extraterritorially is an unsettled question, not only because the
status of the parties and the specific guarantees involved might point to differing results,
see United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259 (1990), but also because it can be diffi-
cult to discern the precise nature of the right infringed. Where the courts perceive the
issue to be clearly presented, however, they have intervened. See, for example, Lamont v
Woods, 948 F2d 825, 830 (2d Cir 1991) (Establishment Clause challenge to foreign assist-
ance to church related schools and hospitals); Planned Parenthood Federation v AID, 838
F2d 649 (2d Cir 1988) (challenge to executive decision banning aid to organizations which
perform abortions held to be justiciable), on remand 915 F2d 59 (2d Cir 1991) (rejecting
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims on the merits). Compare Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, 505 US 555 (1992) (standing).
82. The term was coined by President Theodore Roosevelt. See generally James
David Fairbanks, The Priestly Functions of the Presidency: A Discussion of the Literature
on Civil Religion and its Implications for the Study of Presidential Leadership, 11 Presiden-
tial Studies Quarterly 214 (1981).
83. Whether Presidential proclamations, speeches or lobbying activity can violate
either the First or the Fourteenth Amendments is a matter of some dispute which need not
be addressed here. That the President's views concerning religious liberty issues are of
considerable political importance is well-documented. See, for example, Remarks of Sena-
tor John F. Kennedy Before a Meeting of the Greater Houston Ministerial Assn., Houston,
Texas, September 12, 1960; J. Johnson, A Born Again Style at the White House, Washington
Post, January 21, 1977, p A18, col 3; Remarks of President Ronald W, Reagan to the Ecu-
menical Prayer Breakfast, Dallas, Texas, August 23, 1984; Remarks of Walter F. Mondale to
the International Convention of B'nai B'rith, Washington, D.C., September 6, 1984; Gover-
nor Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Per-
spective delivered to the Department of Theology, University of Notre Dame, South Bend,
Indiana, September 13, 1984 (Governor of New York); Representative Henry J. Hyde,
Keeping God in the Closet: Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of Religious Values from Pub-
lic Life, delivered at the Thomas J. White Center on Law & Government, School of Law,
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, September 24, 1984; Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, Faith and Freedom, delivered at Tavern on the Green, New York City, before the
Coalition of Conscience, September 10, 1984. See generally Joseph Cardinal Bernardin,
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into the model of structural constraints elaborated above. Not sur-
prisingly, judicial review of either presents uniquely difficult
problems (such as the President's own First Amendment rights
when speaking from that pulpit) which are beyond the scope of this
essay.84
c) The Federal Judiciary
A structural inquiry also demonstrates that the religious free-
dom guarantees also apply to exercises of the judicial power of the
United States.
At the most basic level, federal judges and Supreme Court Jus-
tices are supposed to be chosen without regard to their religion (or
lack thereof).85 To the extent that Congress has authorized them to
Role of the Religious Leader in the Development of Public Policy in Symposium: The Reli-
gious Leader and Public Policy, 2 J Law & Relig 367, 369 (1984); Edward M. Gaffney,
Biblical Religion and American Politics: Some Historical and Theological Reflections, 1 J
Law & Relig 171 (1983); Richard J. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and
Democracy in America (Eerdmans, 1984); Oscar Handlin, Al Smith and His America (Lit-
tle, Brown & Co., 1958); Gustavus Myers, History of Bigotry in the United States (Random
House, 1943).
84. Justice Jackson wrote that the "actual test of power [in such circumstances] is
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than
on abstract theories of law." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US at 637 (Jack-
son concurring). The Court's approach in practice bears witness to the validity of his ob-
servation. The judicial doctrines of standing, .justiciability, and political question are
designed to limit judicial intervention when abstract theories of law are not adequate to the
"imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables" which are entrusted by the Con-
stitution to the political branches. Examples include: extraterritorial application of the
Constitution to federal authorities acting in foreign nations, the degree to which the either
separation of powers or the First Amendment itself protects the President from judicial or
Congressional oversight of the contents of Presidential negotiations, speeches, correspon-
dence, and proclamations, and decisions made by the President, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, to grant official status to foreign governments and non-governmental
organizations. See, for example, Phelps v Reagan, 812 F2d 1293 (10th Cir 1987) (appoint-
ment of ambassador to the Vatican); Americans United for Separation of Church and State
v Reagan, 786 F2d 194 (3d Cir 1986), cert denied sub nom American Baptist Churches v
Reagan, 479 US 914 (1986) (same). See generally James David Fairbanks, Religious
Dimensions of Presidential Leadership: The Case of Dwight Eisenhower, 12 Presidential
Quarterly Studies 261 (1982); Ronald B. Flowers, President Jimmy Carter, Evangelicalism,
Church-State Relations, and Civil Religion, 25 Journal of Church & State 113 (1983); Albert
J. Menendez, Was Kennedy Sincere About Church-State Separation?, Church & State (No-
vember, 1977) 12.
85. US Const Art VI, cl 3 (Test Clause). Politicians, however, sometimes forget that
religion should not qualify or disqualify a judicial candidate-concerns about "balance" on
the Court to the contrary notwithstanding. The comments of Virginia Governor Douglas
Wilder, who suggested that Justice (then-nominee) Clarence Thomas should be examined
by the Senators concerning his "'allegiance to the Pope" were notable in that they disclose
all too clearly that religious tests for public office are not a vestige of the past. The com-
mentary which appeared after Wilder's comments was even more interesting, in that much
of it assumed that a judicial candidate's religious views are legitimate cause for concern
355]
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hire individuals to assist them in their work (for example, law
clerks, bailiffs, and clerks of court), the Test Clause expressly for-
bids religious discrimination by members of the judicial branch.
Once in office, federal judges, like every other federal officer and
State judge, are bound by "Oath or Affirmation, to support [the]
Constitution.
86
(1) The Power to Decide Cases and Controversies
The most significant structural limitation on judicial power can
be found in Article III itself. The subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts is limited to, among other things, the decision of
"Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority," and to those cases in which the fed-
eral judiciary is to serve as the impartial arbiter of public or private
law controversies which arise under the law of admiralty, or of a
State, foreign nation, or the law of nations.87
Because the Constitution expressly sets out to limit the power
of the federal government to act in a manner inconsistent with
either the religious freedom rights of individuals, or the reserved
powers of the States, it provides no warrant for the judicial resolu-
tion of a case by reference to religious factors.88 To the extent that
when they may disagree with a publicly stated position of the United States Supreme
Court. See Jim Cleardy, Wilder on Defensive after Gaffe, The Washington Times (Nov 4,
1991). See also Michael Posner, Wilder, Descendent of Slaves, Has Major Mark in History
Books, Reuters (Jan 8, 1992). See George Kannar, Thomas & Benedict: The Judge's Patron
Saint; Clarence Thomas; Saint Benedict the Moor, The New Republic (Oct 14, 1991). West
Virginia Senator Robert Byrd, who voted against Thomas after noting approvingly that
Hill's family "had belonged to the church and belong to the church today," and that she
"was evidently reared by religious parents" provides another example. See Stephen Chap-
man, The Odd Role Of Religion In The Hill-Thomas Uproar, Chicago Tribune, October 20,
1991 (final ed), Perspective p 3, zone c. Why Ms. Hill's credibility was enhanced by her
religious upbringing (identified by the news media as Baptist), but Judge Thomas' credibil-
ity was not, leads to either of two unsavory conclusions: 1) that Senator Byrd was looking
for a political excuse that would sound good to the people of West Virginia (the more
likely reason); or 2) that Senator Byrd actually believes that one can trust a Baptist to tell
the truth more than one can trust a person raised as a Catholic. Both cases, Wilder's and
Byrd's, stand as stark reminders that even public servants who believe themselves to be
strong supporters of "civil rights" misunderstand (or ignore) the fact that religious lib-
erty-in this case freedom from religious tests for public office-is also a "civil right".
86. US Const Art VI, cl 3, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
87. US Const Art III § 2.
88. The notion that any court might consider the religious preference of the parties to
a case to be a legitimate factor influencing its decision in a case where the issue was not
directly relevant to the merits of the controversy is so outlandish as not to warrant further
mention. It should be noted, however, that the potential for disparate treatment of finan-
[Vol. 11
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
the Court is interpreting laws and treaties, the express grants and
limits confining the exercise of Congressional authority supply an
implicit limit on the judicial power. Since Congress has no author-
ity under the Constitution or the First Amendment to prohibit reli-
gious exercise, or to define (or confine) the "proper" relationship
of religious institutions and their members with and in their respec-
tive state and local political communities, otherwise valid statutory
rules of decision will not be religious in character.89
It is only in those relatively rare cases, where the power of
Congress to legislate for the general welfare90 is challenged as an
infringement of religious liberty, will the Court be called upon to
so much as consider the religious beliefs of the litigants.91 And in
those cases, which involve either the interpretation of a statute, or
the meaning of the Constitution itself, the Supremacy Clause re-
quires that the interpretation itself should be guided not only by
the religious liberty norms of the Test Clause (to the extent they
cial obligations to religious societies by the federal courts was a concern of Representative
Huntington of Connecticut:
If an action was brought before a Federal Court on any of these cases, he feared
the person who had neglected to perform his engagements could not be com-
pelled to do it; for support of ministers, or building of places of worship might be
construed into a religious establishment.
Madison responded by underscoring the point of his proposal: to assure that the power of
the federal government (he used the term "national") would not be utilized to "establish a
[national] religion to which they would compel others to conform." Annals of Congress, I,
757-59. Compare Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595 (1979) ("neutral principles of law utilized to
decide civil controversies arising from intra-church disputes).
89. The methodology utilized to decide cases like Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985)
and Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578 (1987), 107 S Ct 2573 (1987), where the Court con-
cluded that the statutes involved had no secular purpose, is distinguishable, both legally
and politically, from the admittedly idealized proposition stated in the text. The Court's
religious liberty jurisprudence, including the three-pronged test enunciated in Lemon v
Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971) simply assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment empowers
it to make such determinations. See notes 111-153 and 186-202.
90. The term here is used in both its constitutional and its "generic" sense. It in-
cludes, for example, the power of Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to
forbid religious discrimination by private employers, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, §§ 701(j), 702, and 703(a-e), 42 USC §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-1, 2000e-2(a-
e), as well as the power of Congress to legislate against the possession and distribution of
controlled substances which move in interstate or international commerce. See, for exam-
ple, United States v Rush, 738 F2d 497 (1st Cir 1984), cert denied, 470 US 1004 (1985)
(rules applied to Ethiopian Coptic Church, which views marijuana as a sacramental ob-
ject); Olsen v Iowa, 649 F Supp 14 (S D Iowa, 1986), aff'd, 808 F2d 652 (8th Cir, 1986)
(same, as applied to a priest of the Church).
91. See, for example, United States v Lee, 455 US 252 (1982); Reynolds v United States,
98 US 145 (1878).
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apply) and the First Amendment, 92 but also by all other constitu-
tional norms which are relevant to the task at hand.93
Where the judicial task is to decide a case which does not arise
under federal law, the structural task is a bit more difficult. If the
rule of decision is not of federal origin, the First Amendment can-
not operate as a direct constraint on the outcome unless some basis
can be found for applying it to the sovereignty whose substantive
law does supply the rule of decision. A proper structural analysis
in cases where the First Amendment does not govern the rule of
decision (for example, a claim arising under the law of a foreign
country or religious tradition having a formal body of law such as
Islam) will focus on that which is subject to federal scrutiny: the
jurisdictional and procedural rules which define the nature and
scope of the authority of the forum itself.94
(2) Interpreting the Constitution
When the power to interpret the Constitution is considered, a
particularly difficult conceptual problem arises. In substance, it is
not unlike the problem addressed by the Court in Erie v
Tompkins:95 by what right do the federal courts claim the power to
"make" law, constitutional or otherwise? 96
Mark DeWolfe Howe has written:
92. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v Amos, 483 US 327 (1987); Bowen v Kendrick, 484 US 942 (1987); N.L.R.B. v
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 US 490 (1971).
93. US Const Art VI, cl 2 (Supremacy Clause) The most obvious examples are those
setting forth the Court's jurisdiction, separation of powers, and federalism. See cases cited
at note 84. Equally significant are the protection of free speech, press, the right to petition
for redress of grievances, US Const Amend 1 (1791), and equal protection of the laws. US
Const Amend V. See Boiling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954).
94. In diversity cases, for example, federal courts apply State or foreign law to resolve
the merits of the underlying controversy because the federal government may have no
authority to supply the rule of decision. Compare Erie v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938)(stat-
utory and decisional law) with Swift v Tyson, 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842). They nonetheless
retain their character as federal tribunals, bound to perform their duty in a manner other-
wise consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hanna v Plumer, 380
US 460 (1965) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Byrd v Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop-
erative, Inc., 356 US 525 (1958) (Seventh Amendment). Judicial intervention in intra-reli-
gious disputes raises "jurisdictional issues of this type. See, for example, Jones v Wolf, 443
US 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696 (1976); Ray-
bum v General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F2d 1164 (4th Cir 1985).
95. 304 US 64 (1938). See text at note 27.
96. Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Book Review, Common Law Court Or Council
Of Revision?, 101 Yale L J 949 (1992) [reviewing Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the
Constitution (Yale U Press, 1990)].
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Among the stupendous powers of the Supreme Court of the
United States, there are two which in logic may be independent
and yet in fact are related. The one is the power, through an
articulate search for principle, to interpret history. The other is
the power, through the disposition of cases, to make it.97
The tough conceptual problem is how to distinguish the power to
interpret the Constitution from the power to create constitutional
law.98 The power to interpret the law of the Constitution is neces-
sarily implied from Article III's grant of judicial power to decide
"case" and "controversies," but it is limited structurally not only by
the Constitution's grant of specific areas of legislative jurisdiction
to Congress, 99 but also by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments' res-
ervation of all residual law-making power to the States and the
People. The power of constitution-making was carefully reserved
to the People themselves by the elaborate mechanisms of Article
V.
When the issues before the Court are limited to interpretive
questions arising under the enumerated powers of Congress, as
they were in the pre-incorporation period, 1' ° the power "to say
what the law is" with respect to matters of religious liberty (includ-
ing church-state relations) is necessarily limited by the scope of
those enumerated powers. Because the basic issue in those cases is
the scope of the enumerated power in question, the power of judi-
cial review implicit in Article III101 is only as broad as the question
presented; that is, the scope of Congress' power to make laws re-
specting religious establishments and the freedom of individuals
and institutions to live in accordance with the dictates of their re-
spective faiths.
97. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness 3 (U Chicago Press, 1965).
98. An extensive discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this paper. A useful
set of the distinctions is drawn in Louis Lusky's chapter entitled "Lawmaking and Consti-
tution-making", in Lusky, By What Right? A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Power
to Revise the Constitution at 59 (cited in note 1). James B. Beam Distilling Co. v Georgia,
111 S Ct 2439 (1991) is a recent example of the continuing debate among the Justices on
the nature of the judicial lawmaking function. The case is discussed at note 103.
99. See US Const Art I §§ 1; 8; Art II, § 1, cl 4, § 2; Art III §§ 1-3; Art IV §§ 1, 3; Art
V.
100. See, for example, Bradfield v Roberts, 175 US 291 (1899) (Art I, § 8, cl 17 [Seat of
Government Clause] (was a grant to a District of Columbia hospital operated by an order
of Catholic nuns a law respecting an "establishment of religion?"); Rector of Holy Trinity
Church v United States, 143 US 457 (1892) (Art I, § 8, cl 4 [power to prescribe uniform
rules of naturalization]; application of facially neutral immigration law to clergy immigrat-
ing from abroad to meet the religious needs of the faithful).
101. US Const Art III.
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There is, of course, no question that the Court "makes" law
when it resolves a controversy over the normative content of a dis-
puted constitutional provision. But the role the Court plays in such
a controversy is limited by the structural components of the ques-
tion presented. Such a role is quite different from the role the
Court might play were it sitting as the arbiter of cases arising under
the common law, or in a Council of Revision such as that pro-
posed-and rejected-by the Constitutional Convention.10
2
One way to illustrate the distinction is by comparison of the
structural constraints which limit the judicial power to settle cases
and controversies "arising under" the constitution and laws of the
United States with those limiting the power of federal courts to
supply the rule of decision in diversity cases, the most familiar class
of cases which do not.
10 3
102. The "Virginia Plan" submitted to the Convention by Governor Edmund Ran-
dolph, but proposed by Madison himself, contained provisions for both a Congressional
negative on State laws, and a Council of Revision comprised of the Executive and mem-
bers of the judiciary which would pre-screen laws passed by Congress. Both were rejected.
For the text of the Virginia Plan, see Ralph Ketcham, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the
Constitutional Convention Debates at 35-39 (Mentor, 1986). For a discussion of the fate of
these proposals, see Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the
Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 The WM & Mary Q 215 (1979);
Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary at 300-312 (Harvard U Press, 1977); Raoul Berger,
Congress vs. The Supreme Court at 47-119 (Harvard U Press, 1966).
103. Another good example is the debate among the members of the Court on the
question of the retroactive effect of newly-announced constitutional rules. See, for exam-
ple, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v Georgia, 501 US 529 (1991); American Trucking Ass'n,
Inc. v Smith, 496 US 167 (1990); Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314 (1987). See also Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind v Gilberton, 501 US 350 (1991) (power to imply a statute of limitations
governing and "implied" cause of action under the Securities Act of 1934). In James B.
Beam, the Court was badly split (2-1-3-3) over the precise mechanism by which retroactiv-
ity issues are to be determined. The differences cast considerable light on their views con-
cerning the role of the judiciary under Article III.
The six-member plurality in James B. Beam held that "when the Court has applied a
rule of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by
procedural requirements or res judicata." 501 US at 543. The concurring opinions of Jus-
tices Scalia, Marshall and Blackmun take the most "structural" approach to this question,
viewing the issue of retroactivity as one of which involves "basic norms of constitutional
adjudication." Id at 547 (Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia concurring in the judgment); id at
547-549 (Scalia, Marshall and Blackmun concurring in the judgment). In the view of these
three Justices, prospectivity, (both "selective" and "pure") are unconstitutional assertions
of a power to "appl[y] principles determined to be wrong to litigants who are in or may still
come to court." Id at 547-548 (opinion of Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia), and the exist-
ence of such a power "render[s] courts substantially more free to 'make new law,' and thus
to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the
three Branches." Id at 549 (opinion of Scalia, Marshall and Blackmun). Justices Souter &
Stevens, who announced the judgment of the Court in James B. Beam, view the issue of
retroactivity as involving both a "choice-of-law" component (which law to apply-old or
new), and a remedial question which arises when the choice is to apply the new ruling
retroactively. Id at 534-535 (opinion of Souter & Stevens). Given their holding that once a
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In constitutional cases (including those which turn on preemp-
tion grounds), both the controversy and its ultimate resolution
turns on the relationship of the powers granted to those denied or
retained under the terms of the Constitution itself. Judicial review
is, in essence, the power to determine whose power is at stake by
striking a balance between competing claims of authority."° To
the extent that rules of law may be derived from a balancing pro-
cess of this sort, they are necessarily limited by the scope of the
constitutional norms from which they are derived. 10 5
constitutional rule has been altered, "[t]he applicability of rules of law are not to be
switched on and off according to individual hardship." Id at 543, their rejection of "modi-
fied prospectivity" has strong Article III, Supremacy Clause, Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection components. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, by
contrast, view the judicial role as an active one, in which the Court must "determine the
equities of retroactive application of a new rule" under the multi-factor "balancing of equi-
ties" analysis of Chevron Oil Co. v Huson, 404 US 97 (1971). In their view, the outcome of
the choice of law decision determines "whether there is a constitutional violation" to be
remedied "in the first place." American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v Smith, 496 US 167, 181
(1990) (opinion of O'Connor, White and Kennedy, and Rehnquist). Accord, James B.
Beam, 501 US at 546 (White concurring in the judgment) (specifically rejecting the struc-
tural approach of Justices Scalia, Marshall and Blackmun as "unpersuasive" because judges
do "in a real sense 'make' law" and everybody knows it.)
104. Justice Scalia has been the most articulate expositor of this position. See Mistretta
v United States, 488 US 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia dissenting); Midwesco v Bendix, 486 US 888,
895 (1988) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment); CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 US 69, 94, 107 S Ct 1637, 1652 (1987) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). In Midwesco, for example, Justice Scalia distinguished between the balance
struck between competing claims of authority, including those involving individual rights,
and the more policy-oriented forms of balancing which characterize much of the jurispru-
dence under the Dormant Commerce Clause:
Having evaluated the interests on both sides as roughly as this, the Court then
proceeds to judge which is more important. This process is ordinarily called "bal-
ancing," Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25
L.Ed.2d 174 (1970), but the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the inter-
ests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particu-
lar line is longer than a particular rock is heavy. All I am really persuaded of by
the Court's opinion is that the burdens the Court labels "significant" are more
determinative of its decision than the benefits it labels "important." Were it not
for the brief implication that there is here a discrimination unjustified by any state
interest, (citation omitted), I suggest an opinion could as persuasively have been
written coming out the opposite way. We sometimes make similar "balancing"
judgments in determining how far the needs of the State can intrude upon the
liberties of the individual, see, e.g., Boos v. Barry, [citation omitted], but that is of
the essence of the courts' function as the nonpolitical branch. Weighing the gov-
ernmental interests of a State against the needs of interstate commerce is, by
contrast, a task squarely within the responsibility of Congress, see U.S. Const.,
Art. I, s. 8, cl. 3, and "ill suited to the judicial function.
CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95, (1987) Midwesco v Bendix, 486
US 888 at 897 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
105. See, for example, United States v Lopez, - US -, 115 S Ct 1624 (1995); New York
v United States, 112 S Ct 2408 (1992) (elaborating upon the relationship of the Tenth
Amendment to the enumerated powers of Congress, and holding that to the extent that
355]
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. 11
A common-law judge, by contrast, is a policy-maker in the ful-
lest sense of the word. The controversy in a common law case is
focused on the substantive content of the rule of decision and its
consistency with precedent. Because there is no "fundamental
law" (in the Hamiltonian sense). which governs the resolution of
such cases, the rule of decision is provided by the wisdom and
learning of a judge steeped in the common law tradition. The com-
mon law is, by definition, "what the judges say it is."'106
And thus we return to the point made above: that the limits of
the judicial power of the United States to "make" law is limited
structurally by the powers granted to Congress or reserved to the
States and the People. Where neither the Constitution itself, nor
an otherwise-valid act of Congress supplies the substantive rule of
decision, the bare grant of jurisdiction to resolve the controversy
does not carry with it the power to supply the substantive rule
which governs its outcome. 107 Simply stated, federal courts do not
have the power to create substantive law.10 8
Why is this structural insight, gleaned from diversity (and, to a
lesser extent, from Full Faith & Credit cases) important? The short
answer is that without an explicit grant of authority to make policy
"respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof," the federal courts have precisely the same amount
Congress decides to adopt unpopular policy choices, it must do so by exercising its enumer-
ated powers directly. It may not, therefore, attempt to shift the blame for such decisions
from itself to state and local politicians by compelling the States to exercise their sovereign
powers in a manner dictated by Congress.) Five members of the Court appear to accept
this proposition in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v Smith, 496 US 167, 200 (1990) as well.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, argued that both the obligations of the State,
and hence the propriety of the exercise of Article III power, depend upon a proper under-
standing of the constitutional norms which govern the case or controversy. Though they
reached a different conclusion on the merits of the case because they disagreed with Justice
Scalia's view of the constitutional norm (in this case, the "Dormant Commerce Clause"),
they clearly agreed with his analytical approach. See id, 496 US 205 (Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun dissenting). The agreement among these members of the Court is
even more explicit in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v Georgia, 501 US 529 (1991), discussed
at greater length at note 103.
106. Speech of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes at Elmira, New York, May 3, 1907,
in John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations at 700 (Little Brown & Co, 15th and 125th Anniver-
sary ed, 1980).
107. See Erie v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938), rev'g Swift v 7yson, 41 US (16 Pet) 1
(1842).
108. Discussion of the concept of "federal common law" is beyond the scope of this
paper. It should be sufficient to note that, to the extent that it is accurate to describe what
is known as "federal common law" as "common law" as that term is commonly under-
stood, its validity rests on powers clearly enumerated in, or necessarily implied from, the
Constitution itself.
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of authority to make national policy on these subjects as Congress
does: None at all.
II. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON THE EXERCISE OF STATE POWER:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
INCORPORATION DOCTRINE
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment worked a fun-
damental change in the legislative jurisdiction of the federal gov-
ernment. Expressly designed to grant Congress control over
matters affecting the liberty and equality of those formerly held in
the bondage of slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment has become
the conduit through which virtually all of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights have been "incorporated" against the States.10 9
The incorporation of the Religion Clause via the Fourteenth
Amendment has significant structural and substantive conse-
quences. At the structural level, it raises the following questions:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment grant to any branch of the
federal government authority to make policy respecting an "es-
tablishment of religion" (however defined), or the power to de-
fine the permissible scope of the free exercise of religion?
If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, two impor-
tant substantive questions arise.
First, of what relevance is the text of the First Amendment,
which expressly denies Congress such authority? Second, of
what relevance to the interpretation of the First Amendment are
the specific provisions of the Fourteenth?
To date, these questions have largely been subsumed in the theory
(such as it is) of incorporation. 110 And it is to a discussion of that
doctrine that we must now turn.
A. The Incorporation Doctrine
The Incorporation Doctrine has been significant on a multi-
tude of levels, but perhaps the most important one for initial pur-
109. See sources cited at note 111-112.
110. In Lamont v Woods, 948 F2d 825, 836 n 8 (2d Cir 1991), for example, Chief Judge
Oakes opined that while "a corollary purpose of the Establishment Clause was to forbid
the federal government from interfering with the religious establishments maintained by
the States of the Union[, citations omitted] this purpose became irrelevant in 1947, when
the Supreme Court applied the Establishment Clause to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Everson v Board of Ed., 330 US 1, 15-16 (1947)."
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poses is the rhetorical one."' Akhil Reed Amar has observed
(correctly) that, "because of the peculiar logistics of incorporation,
the Fourteenth Amendment itself often seems to drop out of [in-
corporation] analysis. We appear to be applying the Bill of Rights
directly; the Civil War Amendment is mentioned only in passing or
not at all. Like people with spectacles who often forget they are
wearing them, most lawyers read the Bill of Rights through the
lens of the Fourteenth Amendment without realizing how
powerfully that lens has refracted what they see. "112
Professor Amar's work on the incorporation doctrine demon-
strates convincingly that a judicial holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment "incorporates" the substantive commands of the First
Amendment and "applies" them to the States is only the beginning
of the inquiry, not its end. Though the existence of Congressional
power to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights is explicit, 1 3 ex-
ploring the relationship between the power conferred on the fed-
eral government by the Fourteenth Amendment and the power
denied it by the First is a far more complex task than appears from
a reading of the early incorporation cases.
A systematic inquiry into the "application" of the First
Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment would
need to address not only the mechanism of incorporation itself, but
also the structural and substantive implications which flow from it.
Necessarily included in the latter inquiry would be an examination
of the substantive meaning of the religious liberty guarantees
themselves;"14 the manner in which those guarantees are related to
each other; the language, history and intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the relationship of the religious liberty guarantees to
the liberty and equality norms of the Fourteenth Amendment," 5
including those "incorporated" from other sources such as the
111. See Amar, 101 Yale L J at 1193-94 (cited in note 19) (collecting quotes from some
of the most influential commentators on constitutional law and theory).
112. Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1136-37 (cited in note 19).
113. US Const Amend XIV § 5 (1868).
114. The Court's understanding of religious liberty is not discussed in detail in this es-
say, but is the topic of its sequel. The problems which arise from the "selective incorpora-
tion" doctrine are discussed in the text at notes 194 to 200.
115. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment contains four distinct clauses: Citizen-
ship, Privileges and Immunities, Due Process and Equal Protection. The suggestion here is
that they should be read together; and to the extent that other relevant constitutional pro-
visions are germane to the inquiry, those should also factor into the analysis. See, for
example, US Const Art IV, §§ 1, 4 (Interstate Privileges and Immunities and Guaranty
Clauses); Art VI, cl 3 (Test Clause).
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Speech and Press Clause and substantive due process; and the lim-
its, if any, imposed on the exercise of federal power (legislative,
executive, and judicial) by the structural constraints of separation
of powers and federalism.
I shall not, at this point, speculate on the answers to those spe-
cific questions, but I do suggest that neither the many legitimate
concerns raised by the commentators, nor the distrust of the courts
which lies at the root of legislative proposals to "reverse" the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v Smith, can be
addressed systematically without some exploration of the degree to
which the Fourteenth Amendment alone, or in conjunction with
norms incorporated from the First, empowers either the Congress
or the Court to attempt, on a national scale, to "distinguish exactly
the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle
the just bounds that lie between the one and the other."
116
To raise, and to consider carefully, just such questions is to get
back to basics; to explore not only the nature and function of reli-
gious liberty in a continental republic committed to pluralism and
equal citizenship, but also what Mary Ann Glendon and Raul
Yanes have described as "the purpose of the religious freedom lan-
guage and its relation to the Fourteenth Amendment within a mod-
em regulatory state. 11 7 It is a discussion which is long overdue.
The next section illustrates a small, but important, aspect of a
"back to basics" approach: a reconsideration of the manner in
which history is used to guide the interpretation of the constitu-
tional norms governing religious liberty.
B. The Religion Clause, Incorporation, and the
Teachings of History
The political debate over religious freedom has a centuries-old
history, and a dynamic all its own. Professor Amar's observation
that "[t]wentieth century Americans are still living with the legacy
of the Civil War, with modern rhetorical battle lines tracking those
laid down a century ago" 18 is even more relevant when the issue is
religious liberty. The modern rhetorical battles track ancient reli-
116. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1686, Popple trans 1689), in John T.
Noonan, Jr., The Believer and the Powers that Are at 80 (Macmillan, 1987).
117. Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 Mich L Rev 477,
482 (1991). This topic is discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying notes 194 to
200.
118. Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1136 (cited in note 19).
355]
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
gious and philosophical battles with roots in the Inquisition, the
establishment of the Church of England, the Reformation, the En-
lightenment, and the American Revolution itself.
Judicial supervision of the boundary between law and religion
at the federal level is, by contrast, a fairly recent innovation in
American constitutional law.119 Yet it would be naive to suppose
that it has been unaffected by the historical and philosophical back-
drop against which it has developed. Given this reality, the Court's
efforts over the past fifty years raise a number of significant and
unresolved questions.
1. "Originalism" and the Religion Clause
One of the more interesting aspects of the religious liberty ju-
risprudence which has developed since Cantwell v Connecticut2 °
applied the Religion Clause of the First Amendment to the States
is the manner in which historical materials are utilized to deter-
mine the content of its prohibitory norms. One need not delve too
far into the "originalism vs. contemporary understanding" debate
to appreciate that the manner in which that controversy plays out
in the interpretation of the Religion Clause is important. 12 1 The
substantive content of the First Amendment's religious liberty
guarantee must come from somewhere, 22 and the cases have gen-
erally assumed that history is a relevant guide to the meaning of
the constitutional text. 23 I will not question that assumption here.
119. Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947); Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US
296 (1940).
120. Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940).
121. See, for example, L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Justice Scalia's History and Tradition:
The Chief Nightmare in Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 Va L Rev 581 (1992).
122. Compare, for example, Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110 (1989).
123. A notable exception may be Judge Bownes of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. Concurring in Weisman v Lee, 908 F2d 1090 (1st Cir 1990), aff'g, 728
F Supp 68 (DRI 1990), Judge Bownes observed that since "the 'plain meaning' of the text
is of little help in determining results in [cases involving school prayer] ... the interpreta-
tion and practice that has evolved throughout the past two hundred years" is determina-
tive. After dismissing both the "intent of the framers" and the teachings of history in both
the ratification period and the nineteenth century, he concludes that
It is useless to rehash this continuing debate. The ground has been trodden so
much that it is barren of meaning and persuasive power. The "historical record"
is inconclusive on the various cross-currents in the minds of the framers. Because
of the tangled and often conflicting historical record, it is unlikely that, as an
empirical matter, we can ever know the original intention of the authors of the
Constitution. Even if we could reconstruct the framers' intent, that would not
necessarily be determinative in this case, given our two hundred years of experi-




2. "Original Intent" and the Religion Clause
There is much to be learned about the content of the federal
religious liberty guarantee from the laws and the experience, both
political and judicial, of each of the Colonies. The Supreme Court,
however, has been rather selective in its use of history as a device
to give content to the constitutional norms protecting religious lib-
erty. The "Virginia experience" has become the interpretive
touchstone. 24
Whatever the merits of that particular controversy, however,
one thing is certain: the "original intent" of the non-establishment
guarantee has generally been considered quite relevant to its inter-
pretation. 25 There is, by contrast, little discussion of the "original
intent" of either the Free Exercise or Test Clauses.' 26 The "original
intent" of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to matters of
religious liberty seems to attract virtually no attention at all.
127
Selective use of history has a profound effect on the Court's
understanding of the religious liberty guarantee. The most obvious
problem is conceptual. To the extent that an historical perspective
is used as the grounding for the Court's interpretation of any con-
stitutional provision, it is necessary to have a complete (or as near
to complete as possible) understanding of the evil at which that
provision was directed. If the historical understanding is incom-
plete, so too will be the vision of what that provision of the Consti-
124. The Second Circuit has held, for example, that "The drafting and adoption of the
First Amendment, in which Madison and Jefferson played leading roles, can only be under-
stood in light of the Virginia experience." Lamont v Woods, 948 F2d 825, 837 (2d Cir
1991). It even goes so far as to allege that alternative arguments which challenge the pre-
vailing reliance on the Virginia experience represent "scholarship born of advocacy" which
present a "treatment of history [that] is selective and one-sided." Id at 836.
125. See, for example, Lee v Weisman, 112 S Ct 2649, 2656-58 (opinion of the Court,
per Kennedy) (1992); id at 2667 (Souter, O'Connor and Stevens concurring in the judg-
ment); id 2678 (Scalia and Thomas, and Rehnquist dissenting); Everson v Board of Educa-
tion, 330 US 1 (1947). See also Douglas Laycock, "Non-preferential" Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 875 (1985-86); Louis A. Fisher,
American Constitutional Law at 698-783 (McGraw-Hill, 1990).
126. See note 33.
127. A notable exception is Akhil Reed Amar's discussion of the close connection be-
tween the abolitionist movement's reliance on the rights of speech, petition, press and the
religious exercise of preaching as the means of spreading their message. He notes for ex-
ample, a speech given in 1866 by John Bingham, the author of Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment, in which "he reminded his audience that men had been imprisoned in
Georgia for teaching the Bible," and another by Lyman Trumbull, who introduced the
Civil Rights Bill of 1866 "by stressing the need to protect the freedom 'to teach' and 'to
preach,' citing a Mississippi Black Code punishing any 'free negroes and mulattoes' who
dared to 'exercis[e] the functions of a minister of the gospel." Amar, 101 Yale L J at 1275-
77 (cited in note 19).
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tution requires or prohibits.1 8 Without historical grounding, the
language will be infused with whatever meaning seems appropriate
to the time and circumstances.1
2 9
This is particularly true with respect to the Court's paradigm
for understanding the non-establishment principle. The views of
Madison and Jefferson in Colonial Virginia's struggle to come to
128. One of the more interesting debates within the Court on this topic occurs in
Michael H. and Victoria D. v Gerald D., 491 US 110 (1989).
129. See, for example, Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L
Rev 195, 198-201 (1992). Professor Sullivan suggests that the correct baseline for the Reli-
gion Clause "is not unfettered religious liberty, but rather religious liberty insofar as it is
consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral order," and appears to sug-
gest that the members of the Supreme Court know enough about both philosophy and
theology to "draw a distinction between [them]." The point here is not to debate either the
substance of Professor Sullivan's views about the privileges which are to be enjoyed by a
"secular moral order", or the validity of her implicit assumption that the legal training of
judges and Justices equips them to make fine philosophical and theological distinctions
which can (or should) have the force of law. In structural terms, Professor Sullivan's argu-
ment has two glaring weaknesses, neither of which is addressed in her article.
First, she does not demonstrate the existence of a grant of authority to the federal
government, express or implied, which would empower it to "establish" any "moral order,"
secular or otherwise. That would be impossible. Her argument, instead, is that "[j]ust as
the affirmative right to practice a specific religion implies the negative right to practice
none, so the negative bar against establishment of religion implies the affirmative 'estab-
lishment' of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes." 59 U Chi L Rev 197-
98. The key word here is "implies"-and her use of it to transform the Establishment
Clause into an affirmative grant of federal authority to define and enforce a "secular"
moral order illustrates the point made in the text. Reading the First Amendment, both as a
whole and in light of its history and that of the Test Clause, illustrates that "establishment"
of either an exclusive moral or political orthodoxy by the federal government is precisely
what the Framers feared-and they explicitly rejected the existence of any such power by
adopting the Test Clause and the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
The second structural point is related to the first. Professor Sullivan's position that
religious liberty is not "unfettered" rests on the structural argument that the Establishment
Clause should have a legal effect which is quite distinct from that of either the Free Exer-
cise or Speech Clause. Yet like most commentators on the Religion Clause, she ignores an
important structural and analytical component of her own argument: the Fourteenth
Amendment. The operative constitutional provision at the heart of most of the cases she
cites is not the First Amendment, but the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. And
since the regime of religious liberty she elaborates is dependent on the meaning of that
amendment (at least insofar as it binds the States), an argument which ignores its impact is,
at the very least, inconsistent with the view that constitutional provisions should be read as
having distinct legal effects.
In sum, Professor Sullivan's argument is structurally incomplete to the extent that the
analysis rests, ultimately, on a reading of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
which holds only them in "tension." See note 32. If she is correct that the correct baseline
"is not unfettered religious liberty," but only that which "is consistent with the establish-
ment of the secular public moral order," the same must also be true with respect to all
other forms of "liberty" incorporated by or implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, including speech, association, and the personal interests collectively
known as "privacy" rights. Compare Robert Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Por-
nography, Blasphemy and the First Amendment, 76 Cal L Rev 297 (1988).
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grips with the fact of religious diversity and state-sponsored op-
pression during the period prior to 1785130 have provided some
members of the Court with a starting point for their analysis,
131
while other members of the Court appear to view what is clearly an
incomplete historical picture of what might be termed the "Virginia
understanding' 1 32 as synonymous with the non-establishment norm
itself.
133
Discussions of the free exercise norm, by contrast, are gener-
ally grounded in a rather truncated justification of the limits a free
130. Noonan, The Believer and the Powers That Are at 93-113 (cited in note 116) (re-
counting the Virginia experience).
131. Even though the struggle for religious liberty in other States contains important
insights concerning some of the evils against which the Test Clause and First Amendment
were directed, they have never figured, prominently or otherwise, in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the non-establishment norm. See Chester J. Antieau, Arthur T. Downey
& Edward C. Roberts, Freedom from Federal Establishment: Formation and Early History
of the First Amendment Religion Clauses at 161-63 (Bruce, 1964) (briefly discussing devel-
opments in the States from 1776-1825). Neither, for that matter, has either the text or
structure of the Constitution itself. See, for example, Everson v Board of Education, 330
US 1 (1947). Members of the Court have, however, utilized the Virginia debate over gen-
eral assessments for the payment of the salaries of Christian ministers as the jumping off
point for an elaboration of their own respective views concerning the "proper" relationship
of law to religious activity. See id, 330 US at 11-14, 31-32 (Rutledge, Frankfurter, Burton
and Jackson dissenting) ("[T]he object [of the first amendment] was ... to create a com-
plete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.")
132. See, for example, Rhys Isaac, Evangelical Revolt: The Nature of the Baptists' Chal-
lenge to the Traditional Order in Virginia, 1765 to 1775, 31 Wm & Mary Q 345 (1974).
Professor Isaac's article notes the important cultural components Qf the Virginia experi-
ence, and their relationship to "assumptions concerning the nature of community religious
corporateness that underlay aggressive defense against the Baptists." Id at 368. That the
Revolution's republican ideology played a major role in rendering such assumptions illegit-
imate, and led to the eventual adoption of a policy of "accommodation in a more pluralist
republican society" in Virginia is significant in both structural and substantive terms. Id.
At the structural level, the concern for the maintenance of the integrity of individual polit-
ical and faith communities is an important motivation for the political insistence on the
part of the Anti-federalists and the States for the adoption of a Bill of Rights. The Civil
War and later voting rights amendments make it clear at the substantive level that all citi-
zens are members of those "pluralistic, republican communities," and are entitled to equal
civil and political rights. Notably, each amendment contains an important structural com-
ponent as well.
133. See, for example, Lee v Weisman, 112 S Ct 2649, 2667, 2770 (1992) (Souter, Ste-
vens and O'Connor concurring) (relying on the Virginia experience and Statute for Reli-
gious Freedom as indicative of "separationist response" throughout the country).
Examination of the ratification debates generally-and those involving the Test Clause in
particular-indicate that one criticism of the new Constitution is that it did not invoke the
name of the Deity. Another was that the absence of religious tests might make for a re-
gime of religious liberty which was too tolerant of religious diversity; for it would permit "a
Papist or an infidel" to serve in the federal government. See Antieau, Freedom from Fed-
eral Establishment: Formation and Early History of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
at 92-113 (cited in note 9); Bradley, 37 Case W L Rev 674 (cited in note 33).
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. 11
society may impose upon individual liberty.134  The Supreme
Court's discussions of free exercise generally begin with the deci-
sion in Reynolds v United States,13  and its observation that, by
their nature, free exercise rights cannot be absolute. 36 Reynolds
and its modem progeny, however, do not reflect either a reading of
the original legislative intent of the Free Exercise Clause (though it
may reflect it), or an attempt to ascertain the evils against which it
was erected. Reynolds clearly reflects the late-Nineteenth Century
cultural, racial, and religious perspectives of the Supreme Court it-
self,137 and the current case law and commentary is replete with
references to a more modem vision of the proper scope of religious
liberty in a pluralistic democracy.
The omission of any meaningful discussion of the intent and
history of the Test Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment is also
significant. Both speak strongly to the need for equal treatment of
persons and citizens by their government. More important, close
scrutiny of the state-sponsored practices at which they, and the
First Amendment itself, were aimed would provide a useful back-
drop against which to view contemporary policy.
134. The most recent-and controversial-example is Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990).
135. 98 US 145 (1878).
136. A good example is the opinion of Justice O'Connor concurring in the judgment in
Smith II. Condemning the majority's approach to Free Exercise Clause cases, Justice
O'Connor, joined on this point by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, wrote:
To say that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened, of course, does
not mean that he has an absolute right to engage in the conduct. Under our estab-
lished First Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to
act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute. [citing Cantwell and Reyn-
olds v United States]. Instead, we have respected both the First Amendment's
express textual mandate and the governmental interest in regulation of conduct
by requiring the Government to justify any substantial burden on religiously mo-
tivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.
Smith, 11, 494 US at 894.
137. The imagery of community, race and culture evoked by Chief Justice Waite's opin-
ion for the Court rejecting the Mormon practice of polygamy could not have been clearer:
"Polygamy," he stated, "ha[d] always been odious among the northern and western nations
of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a
feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people." Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8
Otto) 145, 164 (1878). The similarity between Chief Justice Waite's concepts of legitimate
culture, which certainly reflected the views of "the thoughtful part of the Nation" at the
time Reynolds was decided, and those of the Virginia gentry during the Revolutionary
period, who also considered themselves to be "the thoughtful part of" their community,
are striking. See Robert A. Destro, Review Essay, The Supreme Court, the "Facts of Life,"
and the Moral Sensibilities of "the Thoughtful Part of the Nation," 20 Human Life Rev 28-
48 (Summer, 1994) (reviewing David Garrow's Liberty & Sexuality: The Rights of Privacy
and the Making of Roe v. Wade).
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Scholarly commentary follows much the same pattern: Estab-
lishment Clause commentary relies heavily upon the teachings of
Virginia history as the ultimate grounding for the Establishment
Clause, while Free Exercise discussions are rarely framed in histor-
ical terms. 138 Non-discrimination norms get even less attention.
139
Recent scholarship, however, indicates that this pattern may be
changing.
40
Without questioning the relevance of either the Mormon po-
lygamy cases 14' to our understanding of the concept of "free exer-
cise," or of the Virginia experience to our understanding of the
concept of non-establishment, it seems fairly clear that to draw the
content of these religious liberty norms from either set of materials
alone is a mistake with immense ramifications for individual rights.
The history is far more extensive, and paints a far more complex
picture of the problem at which the Test Clause and the First,
Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments were aimed than that
sketched out by the Court to date. We must, as Judge John T. Noo-
nan, Jr. has observed, "immerse ourselves in history":
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic." "The life of the
law has not been logic but experience." These two axioms of
Holmes-always given lip service by law schools but rarely
taken seriously in academic milieus where the arts of logic flour-
ish-are here, if anywhere, the keys of understanding. It is not
only a matter of grasping the intentions of the Founding Fathers
(a necessity if our national notion of a written Constitution as
138. Compare, Laycock, "Non-Preferential" Aid to Religion (cited in note 125) (exten-
sive analysis of history), with Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment
and Doctrinal Development Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 Harv L Rev 1381
(1968)(no real historical analysis) and McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev 1410 (cited in note
33)(extensive historical analysis).
139. But see Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal
Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L Rev 311
(1986).
140. See generally, Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly
Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitu-
tion, 51 Ohio St L J 89 (1990)(Due Process analysis of religious liberty generally); Bradley,
20 Hofstra L Rev 245 (cited in note 65) (historical analysis of free exercise norms); Ira C.
Lupu, Reconstncting the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommo-
dation of Religion, 140 U Pa L Rev 555 (1991); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U Chi L Rev 308 (1991); Laurence Tribe, American
Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 2d ed 1988) 1154-1301 (religious freedom as a right
of "personal autonomy"); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemp-
tions, 4 Notre Dame J of Law, Ethics & Pub Pol'y 591 (1990).
141. The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v United
States, 136 US 1 (1889); Davis v Beason, 133 US 333 (1889); Reynolds v United States, 98
US 145 (1878).
355]
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
bedrock is to have validity.) It is also a matter of empathetically
appropriating the experience that undergirds the constitutional
principles of free exercise and no establishment. The experience
that made the law is capturable only through history. To know
the price other systems have exacted, to know the prize we have,
we must immerse ourselves in history.'42
3. Freedom from Federal Establishment as a Component of
Religious Liberty
The relevance of Judge Noonan's observation is apparent from
the text of the First Amendment: by its terms, it does not apply to
the States. 4 3 The omission is significant for several reasons, not
the least of which is that there is no dispute whatever as to its
"original intent". The language "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof" was designed explicitly to negate any assertion that
the federal government had a generalized power to do that which is
"necessary and proper" with respect to religion; whether it was to
follow Locke and attempt to "distinguish exactly the business of
civil government from that of religion,"'" to establish or disestab-
lish an official church, or to inhibit religious exercise altogether.145
Since the framers also believed that a strong central govern-
ment with unlimited authority (such as the British Crown) was a
danger to freedom, they created a federal government of divided
and enumerated powers explicitly granted by the Constitution. All
other power-including the power to define the substantive con-
tent of their own religious liberty norms-was reserved to the peo-
ple and the States. 46 Federalism and separation of powers-the
142. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Believer and the Powers That Are at xiii (Macmillan
1987).
143. Barron v Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 US (7 Pet) 243 (1833).
144. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (cited in note 116).
145. See generally Robert S. Alley, ed, James Madison on Religious Liberty (Prome-
theus Books, 1985); Antieau, Freedom From Federal Establishment (cited in note 9); Rob-
ert L. Cord, Separation of Church and State - Historical Fact and Current Fiction
(Lambeth Press, 1982); Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness (U of Chi-
cago Press, 1965); Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause (Macmillan, 1986); Noo-
nan, The Believer and the Powers That Are (cited in note 116); William G. Torpey, Judicial
Doctrines of Religious Rights in America (U of North Carolina Press, 1948).
146. US Const Art VI, cl 3 (1787), amends IX, X (1791). See Permoli v Municipality No.
1 of the City of New Orleans, 44 US (3 How) 589, 609 (1845) ("the Constitution makes no
provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberties; this
is left to the State constitutions and laws; nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Consti-
tution of the United States in this respect on the States."); Hale v Everett, 53 NH 9, 16 Am
Rep 82 (NH, 1868) The First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments were adopted at a time of
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allocation of political competence (or subject matter jurisdic-
tion)147-were viewed as, and remain, important mechanisms for
the protection of individual liberty and popular sovereignty.
148
The task of the Supreme Court in the framers' plan was simi-
larly constrained. While the role assigned by Article III necessarily
included interpretation of the First Amendment,149 the limited na-
ture of federal power and jurisdiction confined its rulings to cases
arising within the jurisdiction of the federal government. 50
4. The Impact of the Fourteenth Amendment: Incorporation
The Fourteenth Amendment created immense substantive and
jurisdictional changes in the balance of federalism. Congress was
given the express power to enforce by law its own substantive vi-
sion of the liberty and equality principles embodied in the Amend-
ment's guarantees-and to make that vision of the "Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens of the United States' 5' binding on the
States. 52 The reach of the Supreme Court's mandate expanded
accordingly,'53 though it sometimes declined to exercise it.'
54
The rhetorical problem with incorporation identified earlier' 55
now begins to take a more palpable shape. The Fourteenth
Amendment is so much a fixture of our present national and con-
transition in the Nation's understanding of the concept of religious liberty. Though some
States, such as New York and Virginia, had abolished their official "establishments,"
others, such as Connecticut and Massachusetts had not. Religiously based civil and polit-
ical disabilities were prominent features of most of the States at the time of ratification,
and for many years thereafter.
147. See note 20.
148. See United States v Lopez, 115 S Ct 1624, 1637-1638 (1995). See generally, Amar,
100 Yale L J 1131 (cited in note 19).
149. Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("... it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.")
150. Quick Bear v Leupp, 210 US 50 (1908) (upholding tuition grants for Sioux Indians
in Catholic schools); Bradfield v Roberts, 175 US 291 (1899)(upholding federal funding of
Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia); The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints v United States, 136 US 1 (1890); Davis v Beason, 133 US 333
(1890); Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878). See Permoli v Municipality No. 1 of the
City of New Orleans, 44 US (3 How) 589, 609 (1845).
151. US Const Amend XIV § 1, cl 2 (1868).
152. US Const Amend XIV § 5 (1868). See generally Raoul Berger, Government By
Judiciary at 31-51 (Harvard U Press, 1977); Akhil Reed Amar, 101 Yale L J at 1193 (cited
in note 19)..
153. See, for example, County of Santa Clara v Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 US 394 (1886)
(assuming that corporations are "persons" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Ex
Parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908).
154. Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896).
155. See text accompanying note 111.
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stitutional identity that it has become both politically and academi-
cally risky to question a number of critical assumptions in
constitutional theory.
That this is so is understandable. But for active federal inter-
vention on behalf of civil rights, our Nation would not have wit-
nessed the gradual, and as yet incomplete, dismantling of our own
peculiar variants of racial, ethnic and religious apartheid. That
such intervention was (and continues to be) both "necessary and
proper" to the integration of all citizens and legal residents into a
pluralistic democratic society should not obscure the fact that, if we
are to succeed in the task we have set out for ourselves, we must be
realistic about the role of the federal government-especially that
of the Court.
Notwithstanding the record of their past failings (which are
certainly mirrored at the federal level), the people, acting as pri-
vate attorneys-general, and through their elected representatives in
Congress, in the States, and in local governments, can and do play
a significant-and often more direct and immediate-role in the
protection of individual rights than does the federal government.
1 5 6
This is not to say, of course, that federal intervention on behalf
of individual rights is not necessary-it is. Rather, the focus must
be on the degree to which the explicit and implicit structural limita-
tions contained in the Constitution both define and limit the fed-
eral role.
This is why the federalism and separation of powers compo-
nents of the religious liberty guarantees are so important. Madison
and Jefferson did not trust any government authority which
claimed the right to set the boundaries of religious liberty. There is
no question that both would have considered it absurd for anyone
to suggest that, just because the States could not be trusted with
the power to define the permissible scope of speech, publication, or
religious exercise, a single branch of the federal government could
be. On this score, in fact, the available historical material cuts pre-
cisely the other way. The debates in the Convention and after
make it clear that there was no doubt about whether individual
rights, including the freedoms of speech, press, religion and trial by
156. See, for example, Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609 (1984) (upholding
Minnesota's ban on sex-discrimination as applied to a private association). Another good
example is the fact that several State constitutions explicitly protect the rights to informa-
tional and other types of privacy, whereas the federal constitution does not. See, for exam-
ple, Ariz Const art 2, section 8; Fla Const art 1, section 23; Wash Const art 1, section 7.
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jury, should be protected. The only question was who could be
trusted to undertake the job.
a) The Early Debates Over Structural Devices for the Protection
of Liberty
Madison, who, as "Publius," wrote eloquently of the merits of
both separation of powers and federalism in The Federalist157 did
not embrace either concept at the Constitutional Convention. He
wrote, and strongly supported, the "Virginia Plan," which called
for proportional representation in both houses of Congress, a Con-
gressional negative on state laws (which would have had the impact
of reducing the States to the status of counties), and judicial partic-
ipation with the Executive in a Council of Revision. Even after the
Convention he remained a nationalist, who strongly believed that
only the Congress of an extended republic would embrace a suffi-
cient multitude of diverse factional interests to assure the forma-
tion of "disinterested majorities, strongly disposed to seek the
general good of the society."'158 In his view, a wide-open and ro-
bust political "marketplace of ideas" and factions was itself an es-
sential structural protection for individual liberties.
Yet, like the Constitution he so eloquently defended as "Pub-
lius," his "Virginia Plan" also contained structural devices clearly
designed to exert a "check" on the power of all levels of govern-
ment, including that of the national government he wanted to see
established. The negative on state laws was designed to check the
power of the States to vex individual liberties, the Council of Revi-
sion the power of Congress,'159 and proportional representation in
the Senate was, in his view, both a reflection of Republicanism, and
a practical check on the power and jealousy of the States among
themselves. 60 But Madison's plan was rejected by the Convention,
157. The most recent author to attribute what are essentially anti-federalist views to
Madison is Akhil Reed Amar. Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1134-36 (cited in note 19). See also
Price Marshall, "No -Political Truth:" The Federalist And Justice Scalia On The Separation
Of Powers, 12 U Ark Little Rock L J 245 (1989). See generally Stephen B. Presser, The
Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Ju-
risprudence (Carolina Academic Press, 1991).
158. Hobson, 36 The Wm & Mary Q at 232-234 (cited in note 102).
159. See Debate on the Judiciary, the Veto and Separation of Powers, July 21, 1787, in
Ketcham, ed, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, at 120-
124 (Mentor, 1986)(cited in note 17) (speeches of Madison and Wilson).
160. See Debate on State Equality in the Senate, June 28-July 2, 1787, in Ketcham, ed,
The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates at 93-113 (cited in
note 17).
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and he left it, confiding to Thomas Jefferson his opinion that the
Constitution would "neither effectually answer its national object
nor prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts
ag[ain]st the state governments.' 161
The Anti-Federalists, by contrast, just as emphatically did not
want a "national" government. 62 Mirroring their distrust of the
proposed federal government was their faith in representatives
known to and trusted by their local communities. 63 To them, the
victory in the American Revolution meant not so much the big
chance to become a wealthy world power, but rather the opportu-
nity to achieve a genuinely republican polity, far from the greed,
lust for power, and tyranny that had generally characterized human
society. It meant "retaining as much as possible the vitality of local
government where rulers and ruled could see, know and under-
stand each other."' 64 So there was a compromise: "the government
contemplated by the Convention was to have a mixed character-
'partly federal and partly national'.'
'1 65
This did not sit well With Madison. During his tenure in the
Virginia House of Delegates he reportedly "became increasingly
disillusioned and finally disgusted with the proceedings of that
161. Hobson, 36 The Wm & Mary Q at 230 (cited in note 102) quoting Letter of James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, September 6, 1787, Papers of Madison, X, 163-164.
162. This point was raised in the House debate over the First Amendment by Elbridge
Gerry, who
did not like the term national, proposed by the gentleman from Virginia
[Madison].... It had been insisted upon by those who were called antifederalists,
that this form of Government consolidated the Union; the honorable gentleman's
motion shows that he considers it in the same light. Those who were called anti-
federalists at that time complained that they had injustice done them by the title,
because they were in favor of a Federal Government, and the others were in favor
of a national one; the federalists were for ratifying the constitution as it stood, and
the others not until amendments were made. Their names then ought not to have
been distinguished by federalists and antifederalists, but rats and antirats. Mr.
Madison withdrew his motion, but observed that the words 'no national religion
shall be established by law,' did not imply the government was a national one;....
Annals of Congress, I, 757-59.
163. See, for example, "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents" (December 18, 1787) (attributed to Sa-
muel Bryan, the author of "Centinel"), in Ketcham, ed, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the
Constitutional Convention Debates at 237 (cited in note 17).
164. R. Ketcham, Antifederalist Political Thought, in id at 17. See Debate on State
Equality in the Senate, June 28-July 2, 1787, in Ketcham, ed, The Anti-Federalist Papers and
the Constitutional Convention Debates at 95 (cited in note 17) (remarks of Dr. Johnson).
165. The phrase is Olliver Ellsworth's, who admitted "that the effect of this motion [for
equal suffrage in the Senate] was to make the general government partly federal and partly
national," a characterization which Madison denied in his speech of July 14, 1787. Hobson,
36 The Wm & Mary Q at 228 n 28 (cited in note 102).
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body."'" To him the problem was that the States-including his
native Virginia-were simply too small to insure that factional di-
versity would exert an effective check on the tendency of legisla-
tures to favoritism and the pursuit of narrow agendas. 67 Though
he had recognized in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments "that no other rule exists by which any question
which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the
will of the majority," he feared its tyranny as well.
And so, it seems, did the Anti-Federalists. The debates over
proportional representation and the Bill of Rights were debates
over power, as well as liberty."6 Olliver Ellsworth, denied James
Wilson's charge that equal representation in the Senate would lead
to minority rule of the majority, and added that "[t]he power is
given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the
many.... Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on
the many?' 69 The antifederalist demands for recognition of the
States as distinct political communities were later reflected in the
call of the State conventions for a Bill of Rights, and both were
political responses to the reasonable fear (shared by Madison him-
self) that the federal government could come to be dominated by
factions inhospitable to the rights of individuals and local
communities.
The question, quite simply, was one of power, and Madison
lost his battles in the Convention and the First Congress because
the majority of delegates and representatives did not share his vi-
sion for a "national" government. Distrust of the proposed gov-
ernment by the constituents of the convention delegates, and a
preference for political decisionmaking at a level of government
closer to the people led the Convention to reject a negative on
State laws on both political and practical grounds. 70 Madison's
proposed amendment to prohibit the States from violating the
rights of conscience, freedom of the press, and trial by jury suffered
the same fate in the First Congress.
Charles Hobson, editor of the James Madison papers at the
University of Virginia, has written that on the very eve of his debut
166. Id at 223.
167. Id at 225.
168. See Brutus, No 2, November 1, 1787 in J. Storing, ed, The Complete Anti-Federalist
at 372-377 (U of Chicago Press, 1981).
169. Debate on State Equality in the Senate, June 28-July 2, 1787, in Ketcham, ed, The
Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates at 101 (cited in note 17).
170. Hobson, 36 The Wm & Mary Q at 225 (cited in note 102).
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in The Federalist, Madison was highly dissatisfied with, not to say
contemptuous of, the proposed government. [Madison's] October
1787 letter [to Jefferson] was a strong dose of nationalism that con-
trasted sharply with "Publius' "celebration of the Constitution and
indeed with all of Madison's subsequent writings."' 171 But after ex-
plaining his opposition to Jefferson one last time, 72 Madison
shelved most of his objections "and never again spoke ill of the
Constitution."' 73 In part out of fear that the Anti-Federalists might
prevail in their attempts to force another convention, 74 and also
because he was convinced that continuing under the Articles of
Confederation would result in anarchy, the consummate political
genius we now know as the "Father" of federalism and separation
of powers became "Publius."
The failure of Madison's proposals, the adoption of a federal
form with separated powers, and Madison's subsequent decision to
support the work of the Convention underscores a fact not often
appreciated fully in today's value-laden and legalistic discourse on
constitutional doctrine: The Constitution and the Bill of Rights are
an integrated political response to a pressing political problem: the
need to create a Union from a loosely organized Confederation.
As a result, the Constitution and Bill of Rights must be read
together. Federalism, separation of powers, the rights enumerated
in the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights are integrated
structural and substantive devices which were intended to be, and
remain, important sources of protection from an overreaching fed-
eral government.
75
Subsequent amendments, including the Fourteenth, must be
viewed from the same structural perspective; that is, what do the
language, structure and history of each amendment tell us about
the evils to which they were addressed? Each is aimed at a specific
political or social problem deemed to be inconsistent with the gen-
171. Id at 233.
172. Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24,1787, Papers of James
Madison, X, 212-214, id at 230-33.
173. Id at 233.
174. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Con-
stitution at 175-245 (West, 1990).
175. See J. Madison, General Defense of the Constitution (June 12, 1788) [presented
during the Virginia Ratification debate]; Letter to Thomas Jefferson-October 17, 1788;
Letter to George Eve-January 2, 1789 in Alley, James Madison on Religious Liberty at
70-75 (cited in note 145); Chester J. Antieau, Arthur T. Downey & Edward C. Roberts,
Freedom from Federal Establishment: Formation and Early History of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses at 111-158 (Bruce, 1964).
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eral welfare of the people. Each resolves a pressing political, as
well as substantive, debate; and does so by utilizing substantive and
structural devices appropriate to the political situation at issue.
Some, like the Civil War and Nineteenth Amendments, provide
protection for individuals, and appear to the contemporary reader
as primarily "substantive" in nature. Others are clear allocations of
governmental power, and function as "structural" controls on the
power of faction. 176 But all have both substantive and structural
components, and must be read together as an integrated whole-as
a "supreme.Law of the Land"' 77-which functions to protect indi-
viduals, and their interests in the preservation of participatory de-
mocracy, from the overreaching of factions operating on both
levels of government: state and federal.
The lesson which should be taken from Madison's experience
in the Convention, in the debates over the Bill of Rights, and as a
leader in the Virginia debates over religious liberty, is that politics
plays an essential role in the protection of individual rights. The
"Virginia experience," upon which so much of our religious liberty
jurisprudence is based, is, at bottom, a political history. By reading
it as a philosophical and legal triumph for Madisonian and Jefferso-
nian ideas, rather than the real-life political battle that it was, the
Court and many commentators may well be missing the point of
the whole story. In fact, Madison's practical experiences as an ad-
vocate embroiled in the politics of religious liberty issues may be a
more accurate guide for the interpretation of the incorporated First
Amendment than are the philosophical positions of Locke, Jeffer-
son, or even those of Madison himself.'
7
1
The roots of Madison's stunning success are found in his abil-
ity to recognize the inherently political nature of the problem fac-
ing those who would protect religious liberty.' 79 He utilized that
176. See, for example, US Const Amends XI (1795); XII (1804); XVII (1913); XXI 2
(1933); XXII (1951); XXIV (1964); XXVII (1992).
177. US Const Art VI.
178. Except to the extent necessary to illustrate a point in the discussion, I will not
make any attempt to discuss the philosophical particulars of Madison's views. That task is
best left to historians, and biographers and philosophers.
179. In his letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 17, 1788, Madison wrote:
Wherever the real power of Government lies, there is the danger of oppression.
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and
the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Gov-
ernment contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from actions in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents...
Wherever there is an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be
done, and not less readily by a powerful & interested party than by a powerful
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insight to great political advantage, first in Virginia, 180 and later, as
"Publius, who wrote that "the great object to which our inquiries
are directed" is "[t]o secure the public good and private rights
against the danger of... faction and at the same time to preserve
the spirit and form of popular government."'181
Had Madison relied solely upon his philosophical convictions
concerning either religious liberty or the structure of government,
he would have lost not only the battle, but also the wars over reli-
gious liberty in Virginia and in Congress. It was his understanding
of both the practical and the sectarian politics of his day that made
him the champion of liberty he is today.8 2 The record of his polit-
ical successes and failures thus contains important lessons, not only
for those who would seek political protection for religious liberty,
and interested prince.... What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve
in popular Governments? I answer the two following which though less essential
than in other Governments, sufficiently recommend the precaution. I. The polit-
ical truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of
fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with
the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion. 2. Altho'
it be generally true as above stated that the danger of oppression lies in the inter-
ested majorities of the people rather than in usurped acts of the Government, yet
there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter sources; and
on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the
community.
R.S. Alley, James Madison on Religious Liberty at 73 (cited in note 145)(emphasis in the
original).
180. Marvin K. Singleton has noted that "Madison had a secular alternative to [Jeffer-
son's suggestion of devout] prayer [for the death of Patrick Henry]: get Henry out of the
legislature by having him elected governor." See Marvin K. Singleton, Colonial Virginia as
First Amendment Matrix: Henry, Madison and the Assessment Establishment in Alley,
James Madison on Religious Liberty at 164 (cited in note 145). Singleton's account of
Madison's role in the Virginia assessment controversy notes that
Madison's role in the assessment fight has been diversely evaluated by posterity.
Eckenrode has asserted that Henry's effort to implement assessment was de-
feated "by the spirit of the age rather than the skill of [its] opponents." This
judgment is inaccurate. Madison and his colleagues proved themselves astute in
their management of the threatened levy. Without the resources of a party be-
hind him, without the machinery of caucus, and without charisma, Madison han-
dled well both parliamentary matters and crystallization of public opinion.
Id at 169.
181. Federalist 10 (Madison) 82 (cited in note 22). Religion was listed first among the
types of faction which needed to be controlled: "The latent causes of faction are thus sown
in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activ-
ity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points ...." Id at 79.
182. See generally Robert S. Alley, The Church of England and Virginia Politics, and
Marvin K. Singleton, Colonial Virginia as First Amendment Matrix: Henry, Madison and
Assessment Establishment in Alley, James Madison on Religious Liberty at 153-172 (cited
in note 145).
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but also for those who suggest that such questions should be "justi-
ciable only.'
'1 83
This is especially so when the Fourteenth Amendment is fac-
tored into the analysis. Section 5 of the Amendment gives Con-
gress-the most political of the branches-explicit power to assure
that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
are preserved, and that all persons are treated equally and fairly in
their dealings with the law. Though such a fundamental structural
alteration in the balance of power necessarily affects everything
within its arguable scope, comparatively little attention has been
given to the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the struc-
tural questions which lie at the heart of the Court's post-incorpora-
tion policy governing religious liberty.
Though the task is a difficult one given the passage of time,
developments in the law, and the impact of stare decisis, it is by no
means untimely. Religion Clause jurisprudence is widely acknowl-
edged to be in an advanced state of disarray, and the intent of this
essay is to suggest that structural analysis is the only way to assure
a systematic discussion of all the relevant issues.
The primary benefit, in our time, of viewing these issues
through the lens of Madison's politics, rather than his political phi-
losophy (to which it is inextricably linked), is that one need not go
beyond the analytical and structural framework of the Constitution
itself to conduct the initial inquiry. The ultimate task, of course, is
to discover which issues are legal (i.e. for judges),184 and which are
political (i.e. for Congress and the State legislatures). 185 And it is
to a discussion of the judicial task to which we must now turn.
183. See Lupu, 140 U Pa L Rev 555 (cited in note 140).
184. Hobson reports that Madison viewed the judicial remedy as inadequate to the task
of protecting individual rights. "[U]nlike the legislative veto, it could not operate until after
the injury had occurred. The procedure was too cumbersome and costly, and would there-
fore fail to provide an immediate and full measure of justice." Hobson, 36 The Wm &
Mary Q at 229 & n 31 (cited in note 102).
185. What Professor Amar describes as the "Madisonian insight that localism and lib-
erty can sometimes work together, rather than at cross-purposes" is perhaps more accu-
rately described as a reflection of Madison's exquisite political sense concerning the impact
that contending, self-interested factions would have on the liberties of individuals in an
extended republic. Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1136 (cited in note 19).
Professor Amar is particularly critical of Dean Jesse Choper's position that "[T]he
assertion that federalism was meant to protect individual constitutional freedoms ... has
no solid historical or logical basis," describing it as "outlandish" and "odd" from the per-
spective of the founding generation. See id at 1205-1206. With due respect to my former
teacher, I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Amar. The language and logic of the Test
Clause and First Amendment point clearly to federalism as a structural mechanism for the
protection of religious liberty. There is no question that a federal test oath would inhibit
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b) The Impact of Selective Incorporation on Federalism and
Separation of Powers
A quantum leap in both structural and substantive terms was
taken when the Court accepted the incorporation doctrine' 86 and
began the piecemeal process' 87 of applying national standards to
the States. Though the full jurisdictional implications of the doc-
trine remain to be worked out in the context of religious liberty,1
8 8
the fact of incorporation is no longer open to serious question. 89
Writing for the Court in Wallace v Jaffree,19° Justice John Paul Ste-
vens rejected United States District Judge Brevard Hand's attempt
to reopen the incorporation debate.' 9' The incorporation of the
the religious liberty of any individual forced to swear it. The threat to liberty it addressed
arose at the federal level. The fact that the very same individual might be forced to swear a
similar, but inconsistent, test oath to qualify for State office illustrates clearly that the logic
of utilizing structural mechanisms such as federalism to protect individuals from federal
overreaching was as apparent to States which had established religions (such as Massachu-
setts), as it was to the Virginia of Jefferson and Madison, which did not.
186. See Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v Nebraska, 164 US 403 (1896); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.
Co. v Chicago, 166 US 226 (1897). The Court had earlier rejected the concept. Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873). See generally Charles Fairman, Does the Four-
teenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan L
Rev 5 (1949); Berger, Government By Judiciary (cited in note 102).
187. Louis Fisher has prepared a very useful table which traces the steps by which in-
corporation has been accomplished. See Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law at
393-94 (cited in note 125). See generally Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L J 74 (1963); William B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, Jesse H.
Choper & Steven H. Shiffrin, Constitutional Law (West, 7th Ed 1991).
188. Witters v State, Com'n for the Blind, 102 Wash 2d 624, 689 P2d 53 (1984), rev'd, 474
US 481 (1986), reaffirmed on state constitutional grounds, 112 Wash 2d 363, 771 P2d 1119
(1989), cert denied, 475 US 1091 (1989) (denial of educational grant to blind student on the
grounds that he would use it to study for the ministry). Four of the nine Justices of the
Washington Supreme Court dissented, and three wrote opinions. Justices Utter, Dolliver
& Dore dissented on the grounds that the majority's holding was inconsistent with the
language of the Washington State Constitution, and that it denied Mr. Witters the right to
practice his religion as he chose. Id 771 P2d at 1124. Justices Dolliver and Dore dissented
on the grounds that the majority's ruling was a denial of Witters' rights under the Free
Exercise Clause. Id, 771 P2d at 1132. And Justice Durham dissented on the grounds that
the Washington State Constitutioh's Establishment Clause should not be construed so
broadly in a case such as this one. Id, 771 P2d at 1136.
189. The question of just how the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the liberty
and equality norms of the Constitution and Bill of Rights is a subject beyond the scope of
this paper. Akhil Reed Amar's work on the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause provides much useful background and critical analysis of earlier sources. See Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131 (1991).
190. Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985).
191. See Jaffree v James, 554 F Supp 1130, 1132 (SD Ala 1983), rev'd 705 F2d 1526
(11th Cir 1983) and 713 F2d 614 (11th Cir 1983) aff'd, Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985).
See also Jaffree v Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 US 1314, 1315-1316
(1983) (Powell, J. Circuit Justice).
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First Amendment, wrote Justice Stevens, is an "elementary propo-
sition of law.'
'1 92
Without questioning that proposition, however, it remains fair
to ask two "elementary" questions in response. First, how can the
prohibitory norms of the Religion Clause be "applied" to the
States without doing violence to the language of the amendment
itself? Second, and equally important, how does the substantive
content of the norms "incorporated" from the First Amendment
relate to other relevant norms which can be derived from the text
and structure of the amended Constitution?
With respect to the first question: how can the prohibitory
norms of the First Amendment be "applied" to the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment without doing violence to the language of
the amendment itself, the answer is relatively straightforward: it
cannot be done without some very fancy interpretive footwork.
193
Part I of this essay demonstrates that, while the First Amend-
ment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
•.. ," the Test Clause as well as the structure of separation of pow-
ers and federalism impose these norms (as well as the others in the
First Amendment) on both the Executive and Judicial branches.
Interpreted in context, the First Amendment is a jurisdictional bar;
that is, Congress has no jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to
matters within its prohibitory norms. The powers of the Executive
and the Judiciary are thus similarly circumscribed.
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, is a
grant to Congress of the power to prescribe with respect to matters
within its scope, and, by definition, to the Executive and Judiciary
of the power to enforce. Thus, to the extent that the bar of the
First Amendment is "incorporated" into the grant of the Four-
teenth, we must consider a rather significant interpretive problem:
What powers concerning the subject matter of the First Amend-
ment does the federal government (including Congress and the
Court) acquire via the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Space constraints preclude a full examination of the problem
in this essay, but it can be illustrated by asking a simple question:
192. Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US at 49.
193. This topic is developed in considerable detail in the part of this essay which could
not be included here due to space limitations. That manuscript, entitled "By What Right?"
* The Sources and Limits of Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters
"Touching Religion," has only recently been submitted for editorial consideration.
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Does the Fourteenth Amendment empower Congress to enact laws
which would prohibit a State from doing any or all of the following:
• setting up or maintaining a church;
" aiding religion in general, or preferring one religion over
another;
" penalizing or mandating church attendance or requiring
profession of belief or disbelief;
" levying taxes to support religious endeavors of any kind; or
" participating in the affairs of religious organizations or insti-
tutions, or permitting them or participate in the affairs of
government?
The obvious answer is that it does not do so "directly." As a
result, Congress' power would be contingent upon a showing that
the evils to which such legislation is addressed must have at least a
colorable relationship, or "nexus," to the guarantees embodied in
the Fourteeth Amendment. Congressional disdain for specific
practices might not be enough. The Court's power would be simi-
larly constrained.
The Court, however, does not view its power under the Four-
teenth Amendment in this way. In Everson v Board of Education,
the Court assumes' 94 that it has the power to impose such an un-
derstaning on both Congress and the States.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one reli-
gion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for en-
tertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Fed-
194. In Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970), Justice Brennan wrote that:
"ITlhe statements of Bingham and Howard in the text indicate, the framers of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment were not always clear whether they understood it
merely as a grant of power to Congress or whether they thought, in addition, that
it would confer power upon the courts, which the courts would use to achieve
equality of rights. Since § 5 is clear in its grant of power to Congress and we have
consistently held that the Admendment grants power to the courts, this issue is of
academic interest only." Id 400 US at 264 & n 37.
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eral Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of reli-
gion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
the church and State.'
195
.The point here is not that the Court is "wrong" in its conclu-
sions about the meaning of either the First or the Fourth Amend-
ment. At this stage of the analysis, the substantive holdings are
largely irrelevant because the issue is one of subject-matter juris-
diction, just as it was in Marbury v Madison, Erie v Tompkins, New
York v United States, and United States v Lopez. Jurisdiction is not
assumed, and can be raised at any point in a proceeding.
196
A discussion of the doctrinal issues is therefore appropriate
only after the existence of federal subject-matter jurisdiction has
been demonstrated. 97 Once that task is complete, it will then be
necessary to address the second question: the relationship between
the First Amendment's "incorporated" norms and other relevant
norms which can be derived from the text and structure of the
amended Constitution?
The most obvious of these issues is the relationship between
and among the norms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Though this too is a very complex topic, Mary Ann Glendon and
Raul Yanes have identified the point at which any thorough analy-
sis of the topic must begin. They point out that a large part of the
current confusion about the nature of the religious liberty guaran-
tee is traceable to Justice Benjamin Cardozo's defense of "selec-
tive" incorporation in Palko v Connecticut.,9 8  By rejecting
wholesale incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights,' 99 Palko neces-
sarily adopts the view that there is "an implied hierarchy of consti-
tutional values."2 0 It also necessarily implies that it is the task of
the Supreme Court to discern both the identity and relative posi-
tion within that hierarchy of the rights identified as, "fundamental."
195. 330 US 1, 15-16 (1947) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
196. See Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws, § 451(2) (Supp. 1948) (discussing the
availability of collateral attack on a judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Re-
statement (2d) Judgments § 11 (1982).
197. Erie v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 79 (1938). See' Reid v Covert, 354 US 1, 5-6 (1957)
(plurality opinion, per Black) (footnote omitted)("[T]he United States is entirely a crea-
ture of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source.").
198. 302 US 319 (1937).
199. Glendon & Yanes, 90 Mich L Rev at 479 (cited in note 117).
200. Id at 479.
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The Court's understanding of the religious liberty guarantees
reflects both its views concerning the existence of an implicit hier-
archy of values, and its assumption that the Court has been en-
trusted by Article III with the task of anointing that hierarchy. In
Palko, Justice Cardozo placed religious liberty among the rights
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and " 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental',"201 but he did not "suggest any more sophisticated rank-
ing than 'in' and 'out', nor [did he] offer an exhaustive catalog of
the rights that ought to be so ranked."202
Professor Glendon and Mr. Yanes view Cardozo's approach
for the Court as a major shortcoming of the decision to incorporate
the religious liberty guarantee. Without giving "some thought
about the purpose of the religious freedom language and its rela-
tion to the Fourteenth Amendment within a modern regulatory
state ' 20 3 the operative vision of religious liberty will not be nearly
as robust as that which animates the interpretation of other consti-
tutional guarantees. Freedom of speech and press provides useful
contrast.
By focusing on the Court's handiwork in Palko, Glendon and
Yanes correctly identify the nexus between structural questions
(whose right or power?) and interpretive ones (the meaning of the
constitutional norm?). They are also correct in their observation
that a number of significant questions have been "glossed over"
during the Court's incorporation project.2°4 Among them are the
following:205
1. Wholly without regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, what
is the relationship among the First Amendment (and other)
norms it incorporates? Should they be construed as components
of an organic "concept of ordered liberty", as "privileges and
immunities" of national citizenship, or as discrete, and some-
times conflicting, limitations on governmental power?
201. Id at 479, quoting Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v
Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934)).
202. Id at 479.
203. Id at 482.
204. See Akhil Reed Amar, 100 Yale L J 1131 (1991); Glendon & Yanes, 90 Mich L
Rev at 482 & n 25 (cited in note 17) (noting Amar's work).
205. Though each of these questions could be the subject of a separate essay, an ex-
haustive treatment is not possible here. The intention is simply to raise the questions, and




2. What is the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment's provi-
sions on the norms it "incorporates"? Do the norms it incorpo-
rates retain their original character (and limitations), or should
they be characterized as "Fourteenth Amendment rights" and
be held subject to the same rules which govern cases which
"arise under" its various provisions?
As important as these questions may be, however, there is an-
other, more fundamental, problem with the "implied hierarchy of
values" model: the Court's implicit claim of power to "rank" via
selective application or avoidance. With respect to religious lib-
erty, this tendency is manifest in the Court's assertion of a broadly-
based federal power to make and enforce national rules which rest
on hazy or unarticulated images of a "proper" or ideal relationship
among three cultures: a secular state, a community of institutions
and believers which defines itself in religious terms, and a diverse
mix of institutions and individuals that define themselves in a vari-
ety of non-religious ways.2
To the extent that the exercises of the "judicial power of the
United States" result in the formulation of rules which govern both
the relationship of law to religion, and the limits on State or Con-
gressional power to strike balances between the needs of believers
and others, at least two additional questions arise:
3. What limits do the religious liberty norms derived from the
Test Clause, and the First Amendment, read together with the
liberty and equality norms of the Fourteenth Amendment and
other relevant constitutional provisions, impose on the exercise
of the power of judicial review?; and
4. Does'judicial incorporation of the First Amendment via the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly
confer legislative powers upon the Congress which the First
Amendment appears to deny?
CONCLUSION
This essay began as an attempt to understand how and why the
Supreme Court became the branch of the federal government
which has undertaken to police the boundary between church and
206. See Gary C. Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the Establishment Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment: The Citizenship Declaration, 26 Ind L Rev 469 (1993)
("Church and state law represents the quintessential opportunity for application of federal-
ist principles. While federalism does not eliminate religious liberty concerns, it provides a
solution which mitigates deleterious effects on freedom. It is a solution which represents
the wisdom of both the past and the present.")
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state. As might be expected in any such inquiry, the research led to
the investigation of many more questions than can be discussed in
one place. This essay should thus be seen for what it is: the first
installment of several articles which explore the manner in which
the Supreme Court of the United States has undertaken to make
policy on what is, next to race, the most exquisitely sensitive issue
of American public policy.
20 7
It is, however, possible to draw several conclusions from the
research summarized to this point. The first is that not enough at-
tention has been given to the manner in which "structural" devices
such as separation of powers and federalism may contribute to the
protection of substantive rights. Though these devices were clearly
among the most important issues debated at the Constitutional
Convention, their import has been obscured by a reading of the
First Amendment which focuses almost exclusively on the work of
Congress and the states, and a reading of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment which focuses only rarely on the important powers claimed
by the Supreme Court.
The second is that the Court's selective use of history obscures
the important political dimensions of debates over the adoption
and interpretation of the First Amendment. Stated baldly, the First
Amendment and Test Clause can be described in present-day terms
as an effort by the Framers to keep the federal government from
setting national "political correctness" standards in matters con-
cerning religion. The Framers would, I think, be quite surprised to
learn that they had atoned for their rejection of Madison's "Vir-
ginia Plan" for the federal government by adopting Madison and
Jefferson's "Virginia experience" as the single appropriate para-
digm for understanding the religious liberty they claimed for
"[them]selves and their posterity."
The last conclusion which can be drawn at this stage of my
structural analysis is that far too little attention has been given to
manner in which the prohibitory norms of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments apply to the activities of the Judicial Branch.20 8 This
too is, in part, a result of both the Court's selective reading of his-
tory, and the tendency of incorporation discussions to focus on the
development of ever-more precise legal standards to resolve doc-
trinal controversies. By focusing exclusively on the history of the
207. See note 193.
208. See, for example, Madsen v Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S Ct 2516 (1994).
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First Amendment, while ignoring the history of the Fourteenth al-
together, the Court begs the critical political question: what powers
do the First and Fourteenth Amendments give to the Court?
Like the answers to the questions addressed in Parts I and II
of this essay, the answer to this last question is "capturable only
through history." I am grateful that the occasion of this festschrift
in honor of John Noonan, jurist, historian, and teacher, has given
me the opportunity "[to] know the price other systems have ex-
acted, to know the prize we have, [and to ] immerse [myself] in
[that] history. ' '20 9 A good teacher like John Noonan does that
wherever he or she may be; in the classroom, in their writings, and
on the bench. 210 And we are grateful for it.
209. J.T. Noonan, Jr., The Believer and the Powers That Are (Macmillan,. 1987) xiii.
210. John Noonan's newest book, Free Exercise! The American Experience of Religious
Freedom is due out in 1996.
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